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Provocation as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse 
 
 
Mitchell N. Berman * 
 
Ian P. Farrell † 
 
 
 
The partial defense of provocation provides that a person who kills in the 
heat of passion brought on by legally adequate provocation is guilty of 
manslaughter rather than murder.  It traces back to the twelfth century, and exists 
today, in some form, in almost every U.S. state and other common law 
jurisdictions.  But long history and wide application have not produced agreement 
on the rationale for the doctrine. To the contrary, the search for a coherent and 
satisfying rationale remains among the main occupations of criminal law theorists. 
 
The dominant scholarly view holds that provocation is best explained and 
defended as a partial excuse, on the grounds that the killer’s inflamed emotional 
state so compromised his ability to conform his conduct to the demands of reason 
and law as to render him substantially less blameworthy for his conduct.  In 
contrast, a small minority of scholars have maintained, without significant 
argumentative support, that provocation is best understood as a partial 
justification, on the ground that the provoked killing is less wrongful than is an 
unprovoked killing, ceteris paribus.  Recently, other commentators have argued 
that provocation mitigation is neither partial excuse nor partial justification. 
 
Against all of these familiar positions, we argue that partial excuse and 
partial justification are necessary and sufficient conditions for provocation 
manslaughter.  In our view, an intentional killing deserves to be punished and 
labeled as manslaughter rather than murder only when, because of provocation, 
this particular killing is significantly less wrongful than is the standard intentional 
killing and when, because of the actor’s partial lack of control, he is less 
blameworthy for committing an act that remains all-things-considered wrongful.  
In elaborating and defending our account, we rebut the oft-repeated but rarely 
challenged propositions that justification and excuse (even in partial forms) are 
mutually exclusive, and that the very notion of partial justification is incoherent.  
We also draw forth implications for how the sentencing ranges for murder and for 
manslaughter should be related. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The partial defense of provocation provides that a person who intentionally 
kills another in the heat of passion brought on by legally adequate provocation is 
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.  The doctrine has both deep roots and 
widespread limbs: the influence of provocation on the common law of homicide 
has been traced back to the Twelfth Century, and some version of the provocation 
defense is part of the law in almost every U.S. state and other common law 
3 
jurisdictions.1  But long history and wide application have not translated into 
agreement on the rationale for the doctrine.  
 
The search for a rationale for the provocation defense has resulted in a 
scholarly debate lasting several decades, but yet to bear satisfactory fruit.  The 
provocation debate is a scion of a broader discussion concerning the character of 
defenses that has consumed a generation of criminal law theorists. Defenses are 
generally classified as either justifications or excuses. While the precise nature of 
the distinction is disputed, justification defenses are generally said to apply when 
the actor’s conduct is not wrongful, whereas excuse defenses are said to apply 
when the actor engages in wrongful conduct but is not liable, particularly because 
not blameworthy.2  Self-defense is usually considered a paradigm example of a 
justification defense, and insanity a paradigm of excuse.  Roughly speaking, a 
person who kills in self-defense has done something of which the law does not 
disapprove, while an insane killer is considered not responsible for his or her 
actions and therefore not properly blamed or punished for them. 
 
Provocation differs from the examples of self-defense and insanity in 
several ways, and as a result has proven particularly obdurate to classification.  
First, a successful plea of provocation does not preclude a conviction for the 
killing.  Rather, the offense is reduced from murder to manslaughter, with the 
available punishment options reduced accordingly.  While self-defense and 
insanity are complete defenses, provocation is a partial defense.  The debate about 
provocation’s rationale has therefore focused on whether provocation is a partial 
justification or a partial excuse.  By analogy, partial justifications would apply 
when an actor’s conduct was less wrongful than if justifying conditions were not 
present, but was still, on balance, wrongful.  Partial excuses would apply when the 
actor was less blameworthy than if excusing conditions were not present, but still 
liable for some punishment.  
 
Second, some elements of the doctrine—such as the requirement of 
“adequate” provocation—suggest that provocation should be treated as a partial 
justification.  Other elements—notably the need for “heat of passion”—point 
towards a rationale of partial excuse.  Like European zoologists confronted with 
the warm-blooded but egg-laying platypus for the first time, criminal scholars have 
struggled to produce a coherent rationale that adequately captures those features of 
the provocation doctrine that seem to pull in opposite directions. 
 
                                                 
1 The majority of U.S. states retain the common law doctrine of provocation.  A substantial 
minority of states have replaced common law provocation with a partial defense based on the 
Model Penal Code’s analogue of killings resulting from “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.”  The relationship between the partial defense at common law and under the Model 
Penal Code is discussed in Part I.  In several U.S. states, such as Illinois and Texas, provocation 
results in a lower category of murder rather than manslaughter.  See ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(1) 
(defining provocation as second degree murder); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(1)(d) (defining 
provocation as a felony of the second degree). 
2 This brief statement of the distinction is, of course, unrefined.  For example, to say that conduct is 
not (criminally) wrong does not entail that it involves no moral wrong.  See Mitchell N. Berman, 
Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2003); Douglas N. Husak, Partial 
Defenses, 11 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 167, 170 (1998).  We will address the distinction in greater detail 
in the body of our Article. 
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Scholars have responded in several ways.  The dominant contemporary 
view is that provocation is best understood as some version of partial excuse.  A 
small minority of scholars have claimed to the contrary that provocation 
manslaughter is, or should be, some kind of partial justification.  Yet another group 
of commentators dissents from both these positions, claiming that provocation is 
neither a partial justification nor a partial excuse. These scholars argue that the 
justification/excuse framework is an inapposite mechanism for making sense of 
provocation. What all these scholars have in common, however, is resistance to the 
obvious possibility that the rationale for provocation is grounded in both partial 
excuse and partial justification.  The near-consensus opinion is that a partial 
defense cannot be coherently grounded in both partial justification and partial 
excuse.3 While the doctrine of provocation is acknowledged to exhibit the 
appearance of both justificatory and excusing characteristics,4 most scholars treat 
this as the puzzle to be resolved, not the key to understanding the doctrine’s 
rationale.5  The apparently dual nature of provocation is usually considered an 
unfortunate artifact of the common law’s ad hoc development, a sign of confused 
thinking by judges and legislatures,6 and evidence of the need to abolish or amend 
the defense.7 
 
                                                 
3 A notable exception to this rule is A.J. Ashworth, who has argued that a combination of partial 
excuse and partial justification provides the normative basis of English provocation law as well as 
describing its key features.  A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 
(1976).  We could find no other whole-hearted advocacy for such a position apart from that of the 
Law Reform Commission of Ireland.  The Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Consultation Paper 
on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation, LRC CP 27-2003, 141.  We address these views Part II.B.2. 
infra, in which we argue that Ashworth and the Irish Commission notwithstanding, no one has 
advanced a compelling theoretical framework for a combined account of provocation, nor provided 
refutations of the main criticisms of such combined accounts. 
4 See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 149 
(“provocation has both justification and excuse dimensions”); Vera Bergelson, Victims and 
Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 
418 (2005) (“In sum, the partial defense of provocation includes elements of both excusatory and 
justificatory rationales.” (emphasis added)); Robert Mison, Comment, Homophobia in 
Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 146 
(1992) (“The common law categories of sufficient provocation are best explained by justification 
analysis, while the concept of excuse appears to be behind the requirement that the defendant act in 
anger.” (emphasis added)) 
5 See, e.g., J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 20 (Alan White ed. 
1968) (“[W]hen we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we 
mean—is he partly responsible, because he roused a violent impulse or passion in me, so that it 
wasn’t truly or merely me acting ‘of my own accord’ (excuse)? Or is it rather that, he having done 
me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?”); Reid Fontaine, Adequate 
(Non)Provocation, at 10 (“American common law has been inconsistent in its treatment of the 
doctrine as one of justification or excuse.”); see also Marcia Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, 
in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS 357 (Cheshire Calhoun ed., 
2004) (“[A] closer look at [provocation] reveals that it is not purely an excuse; it is, somewhat 
confusedly, partly a justification.”).   
6 Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 480 
(1988) (“Confusion surrounds the provocation defense. . . .  It is likely that some of the confusion 
surrounding the defense is inherent to the situation, but it is also probably true that English and 
American courts were insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions while the 
law developed.”). 
7 Baron, supra note 5, at358 (“That the heat of passion is not purely a partial excuse or purely a 
partial justification suggests that the defense needs to be abandoned or modified, or at least 
reconceptualized.”). 
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Even the small handful of scholars who have demonstrated appreciation for 
provocation’s justificatory dimension as well as its excusing dimension 
nonetheless do not frame their positions as a combination of partial justification 
and partial excuse.8  Instead, the orthodox view remains that the act of killing in 
provocation is partially excused, but not partially justified.  This position is 
routinely grounded in the oft-repeated but rarely challenged proposition that 
justification and excuse are mutually exclusive, as well in that proposition’s 
regular stable mate, the claim that partial justification is an incoherent notion. 
 
The orthodox view is wrong.  A coherent and cohesive rationale for 
provocation can be crafted from the dual bases of partial excuse and partial 
justification.  Put simply, partial excuse and partial justification are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for provocation manslaughter.  Neither partial excuse alone, 
nor partial justification alone, provides sufficient mitigation for an intentional, 
wrongful killing to be treated as manslaughter rather than murder.  An intentional 
killing deserves to be treated as manslaughter rather than murder—and deserves to 
be punished accordingly—only when both justifying and excusing conditions 
apply. 
 
We argue that such a rationale is preferable to existing theories of 
provocation along both descriptive and normative dimensions.  The rationale we 
propose not only makes more sense of the contours of the doctrine, but also 
appropriately distinguishes those intentional killings that deserve to be treated as 
manslaughter from those that deserve to be treated as murder.  Indeed, we argue 
that many of the problems associated with the modern application of the 
provocation doctrine9—and especially those associated with its Model Penal Code 
reformulation—result from a failure to fully appreciate the need for partially 
justifying conditions in provocation cases. 
 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I presents an overview of the 
provocation manslaughter doctrine.  Part II critically assesses accounts or theories 
of provocation advanced thus far in the scholarly literature.  Part III briefly 
introduces our competing account according to which mitigation from murder to 
manslaughter is warranted only when actor is both partially justified and partially 
excused.  Part IV adds further flesh to that skeletal presentation in the context of 
anticipating and rebutting possible objections.   
 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997); Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and 
Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REV. 815, 819 (2001); Andrew von Hirsh and Nils Jareborg, Provocation 
and Culpability, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 241, 253 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987). 
9 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 8, at 332 (1997) (criticizing the application of the passion defense to 
numerous cases of intimate homicide in which the victim merely indicated a desire “to leave a 
miserable relationship”); Laurie Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion 
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1679 (1986) (claiming “the 
legal standards that define adequate provocation and passionate ‘human’ weaknesses reflect a male 
view of understandable homicidal violence,” making it difficult for women to secure manslaughter 
verdicts); Susan Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 197, 197 (2005) (arguing that “we should not allow adultery to mitigate murder to voluntary 
manslaughter”); Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as 
Insufficient Provocation, supra note 4. 
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I.  THE DOCTRINE OF PROVOCATION 
 
A. Historical Development 
 
While the influence of provocation on English homicide law can be traced 
back to the decisions of Twelfth Century judges and juries,10 the doctrine of 
provocation began to take a form recognizable to modern scholars during the 
Seventeenth Century.11  Two requirements for a killing to be treated as 
manslaughter due to provocation rather than murder crystallized during this period.  
First, the killing must have occurred while the killer was “in the heat of blood.”  A 
killing in cold-blooded revenge, even if it was in response to provocation, was 
murder.12  Second, the heat of blood must have been brought about by provocation 
that was adequate, that is, sufficiently grave.  The law came to recognize four 
distinct—and exhaustive—categories of provocative conduct “considered 
sufficiently grave to warrant the reduction from murder to manslaughter of a hot-
blooded intentional killing.”13  The categories were: (1) A grossly insultive assault; 
(2) Witnessing an attack upon a friend or relative; (3) Seeing an Englishman 
unlawfully deprived of his liberty; and (4) Witnessing one’s wife (and, obviously, 
another person) in the act of adultery.14 
 
Horder argues that, at their inception, both the heat of passion requirement 
and the categories of adequate provocation reflected the “touchy, quixotic concern 
for honour”15 that was prevalent in early modern England.  According to this social 
code, disdainful or contemptuous conduct was considered an “affront,” an 
intentional attempt to undermine a man’s (presumptively virtuous) reputation.  To 
protect his honor, a man had to retaliate: he had to respond physically, and with 
anger.16  Only a passionate and physical response demonstrated that the affronted 
man possessed the Aristotelian virtues of courage and “spirit.” But such virtues 
were, by definition, the mean between extremes.  The retaliation, while passionate, 
had to be proportionate to the gravity of the affront. 17 
 
The four categories of adequate provocation captured circumstances that 
were considered affronts serious enough to warrant a violent response, but not 
serious enough to warrant a lethal response, in order to re-establish an honorable 
reputation.18  A man who killed in response to provocation falling within one of 
the four categories “departed from the mean in point of retributive justice by 
inflicting excessive retaliation, although, given the gravity of the provocation, it is 
not greatly excessive.”19  As the killer’s actions were an over-reaction—but not a 
gross over-reaction—manslaughter rather than murder was considered the 
                                                 
10 JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, 1-22 (1992).  The following section draws 
heavily on Horder’s thorough and lucid investigation of the evolution of provocation in English 
law. 
11 Id. at 23. 
12 Id. at 23-24. 
13 Id. at 24. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 25. 
16 Id. at 27. 
17 Id.   
18 Id. at 52. 
19 Id. 
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appropriate offense.  If the provocation was so extreme that killing in anger was 
considered an appropriate response, no criminal liability was imposed.20  On the 
other hand, if the provocation was less grave than that which the four categories of 
adequate provocation covered, killing in anger was grossly excessive and therefore 
considered murder.21 
 
According to Horder then, the early provocation doctrine was centered on 
partial justification.  A gravely-affronted man was justified in responding 
physically and angrily.  A proportionate response was fully justified, but an 
excessive response was only partially justified.  Seen through the lens of honor, 
anger or outrage was an integral component of the (fully controlled) righteous 
response of the wronged man.22  Both the heat of blood requirement and the 
adequate provocation requirement were grounded in partial justification.  
Crucially, in this early period of the provocation doctrine’s development, no 
mention was made of loss of self-control.23  There was no suggestion that the 
wronged man had lost control, and therefore no inference that he was not 
responsible for his conduct.  In short, notions of excuse did not play a role in 
deeming a provoked killing to be manslaughter. 
 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, “a new 
conception of anger”24 gained ascendancy.  Anger and other emotions were seen as 
capable of interfering with, even overwhelming, reason.  Sufficient anger was 
therefore understood to cause a loss of self-control.25  As one commentator of the 
time put it, great anger “rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason.”26  This loss 
of self-control, this inability to conform your actions to the dictates of reason, 
became the basis for partially excusing those who killed in the heat of blood.  The 
categories of adequate provocation were retained.  For a time they were important 
for “evidentiary reasons”27: such grave provocation gave rise to a legal 
presumption “that the defendant was in fact carried to revenge by the irresistible 
influence of ungovernable passion.”28  Those who killed as a result of conduct that 
did not fall within the four categories of adequate provocation were presumed not 
to have lost their capacity for self-control.  The cause of the killing was therefore 
traced to the defendant’s malignant design.29 
 
This presumption was, of course, a legal fiction.30  It was possible that a 
person (of particularly bad temper, say) could show that he genuinely lost self-
control as a result of minor provocation—that is, provocative conduct not captured 
by the four categories.  The courts and commentators acknowledged this fiction, 
                                                 
20 “Honour theorists” asserted “a right to administer proportional requital personally, precisely 
because they felt that the law offered no or no adequate means of redress for what men of honour 
took to be serious affronts against honour.”  Id. at 50. 
21 Id. at 52-53. 
22 Id. at 42. 
23 Id. at 42. 
24 Id. at 73. 
25 Id. at 75. 
26 Id. at 76 n.28 (quoting Foster). 
27 Id. at 89. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 96-100; see also Ashworth, supra note 3, at 292-293. 
30 Id. at 94. 
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and the importance of adequate provocation morphed once more.  Lack of 
adequate provocation was taken not as evidence that the defendant could not have 
lost self-control, but rather that the defendant ought not have lost self-control, or 
ought not “to have vented it to the extent [he] did in the circumstances.”31  
Underlying the categories of provocation, as Ashworth puts it, “was more than a 
hint that people ought not to yield to certain types of provocation, and that if they 
did the law should offer no concession to them.”32  The strict categories of 
adequate provocation were gradually softened and eventually the categorical 
approach was replaced by a standard of reasonableness.  Rather than being 
restricted to a predetermined set of situations, adequate provocation was 
determined by reference to whether in the relevant circumstances any reasonable 
person would have been so subject to passion as to temporarily lose control.33   
  
B.  The Current Doctrine of Provocation 
 
The majority of U.S. jurisdictions retain a version of the common law 
defense of provocation.  In these states, the criminal codes have incorporated, 
either explicitly or implicitly, the principles developed by common law.34  The 
doctrine has not, however, developed identically in the jurisdictions that retain the 
common law defense.  The states differ, for example, as to whether mere words35 
or wrongs done to a third party36 can amount to adequate provocation, and as to 
whether a time delay between the provoking act and the killing that would allow a 
reasonable man time to cool off precludes the defense.37  As a result of these 
divergences, it is common to declare that provocation “enjoys no canonical 
definition.”38 These differences notwithstanding, it is possible to identify key 
features of the provocation doctrine that are common to all the jurisdictions that 
retain the common law defense.  Our goal in this Article is to present a rationale 
that explains these central, common features of the provocation doctrine.  We do 
not attempt to provide a rationale that explains doctrinal rules that have been 
accepted by some, but not all, common law jurisdictions.  Indeed, to the extent that 
such rules cannot be explained by our theory, we would consider this as grounds 
for arguing for abandonment of the rules.39 
                                                 
31 Id. at 99. 
32 Ashworth, supra note 3, at 295. 
33 HORDER, supra note 10, at 99. The reasonable person standard has found its way into statutes and 
case law in England and many U.S. states.  See, e.g., Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3 
(Eng.); R. v. Duffy, [1949] 1 All E.R. 932; Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (provocation must be 
“sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person”); see generally, WAYNE LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 448, 777 (4th ed. 2004).  There is some controversy surrounding whether the 
relevant standard is (or should be) a reasonable person or the reasonable person, a reasonable man 
or a reasonable person, and whether the emotion, loss of control or the actual killing or violence has 
to be reasonable.  See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1403; LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra, at 777, and the discussion at note 194, infra. 
34 For a description of the different textual devices employed in the state codes for defining 
provocation, see Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. &  CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982), at 430-31. 
35 See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 780-781; Nourse, Passion’s Progress, 
supra note 8, at 1342. 
36 See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 782-783. 
37 See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 448, supra note 33, at 786-787. 
38 Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677 (2005), at 1691. 
39 A full exploration of which peripheral doctrinal features ought to be abandoned is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  But as a preliminary matter, we consider the “reasonable cooling off period” 
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In eleven states, the common law defense of provocation has been subject 
to significant statutory reform.  The legislatures in these jurisdictions have enacted 
statutes that include language mirroring the “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” provision of the Model Penal Code.40  The resulting defense is 
broader than its common law cousin,41 and the differences between the two 
defenses make it at least debatable whether they share a common rationale. 
 
1.  The common law.—In states that retain the common law defense of 
provocation, an intentional killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to 
manslaughter if, at the time of the killing, the defendant was subject to heat of 
passion caused by adequate provocation.42  From this statement of the doctrine, 
which accords with that given by most commentators, we can isolate three central 
features of the provocation defense: 
 
(1) The actor must have killed while in the heat of passion; 
(2) The heat of passion must have been brought about by adequate 
provocation; 
(3) Provocation is a partial defense. The defense reduces the offense 
from murder to manslaughter. Provocation does not exonerate a 
defendant, but neither is it merely a mitigating factor considered in 
determining the appropriate sentence. 
 
The first two features—heat of passion and adequate provocation—are the 
requirements of the doctrine that a defendant must establish in order for the 
defense to apply.  The third feature—the partial nature of the defense—describes 
the legal effect of the doctrine. 
 
This statement of the doctrine’s key features differs from those some 
commentators provide.  In most cases, the differences are merely of expression, 
rather than reflecting substantive disagreement. For example, Wayne LaFave states 
that there are four obstacles, rather than two, that a defendant must overcome in 
order to establish the defense:  
 
(1) There must have been a reasonable provocation.  (2) The 
defendant must have been in fact provoked.  (3) A reasonable 
person so provoked would not have cooled off in the interval of 
                                                                                                                                       
rule to be a potential candidate for rejection.  On our theory, a person who kills while still in the 
heat of passion, and due to reasons that decrease the wrongfulness of the killing, satisfies the both 
the partial excuse and partial justification requirements of provocation – notwithstanding the fact 
that a reasonable person would have “cooled off” in the interim.  Similarly, we are sympathetic to 
the claim that the provocation defense ought to be available to victims of domestic abuse who kill 
their abusers (though we make no claim that provocation is the best way for the law to deal with 
such situations).  That the person killed was the killer’s abuser partially justifies the act of killing, 
and the existence of some emotional state (whether anger, fear, or some other emotion) affecting 
cognitive capacity satisfies the requirement of partial excuse.   
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b). 
41 See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW (1997), at 711-712. 
42 See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 775 (voluntary manslaughter consists of an 
intentional homicide where “the defendant, when he killed the victim, was in a state of passion 
engendered in him by an adequate provocation”). 
10 
time between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow.  
And (4), the defendant must not in fact have cooled off during the 
interval.43 
 
LaFave’s first two “obstacles,” however, are simply other ways of stating 
what we call the adequate provocation and heat of passion requirements.  LaFave 
uses adequate provocation and reasonable provocation interchangeably,44 and a 
defendant who was “in fact provoked” is one in whom the provocation in fact 
caused the heat of passion.45  LaFave’s third obstacle is best understood as an 
aspect of the adequate provocation requirement: provocation is adequate if it 
would have induced heat of passion in the reasonable person at the time the killing 
occurred.46  LaFave’s fourth obstacle is likewise best treated as an aspect of the 
requirement that the killing occur while the killer is in the heat of passion:  a 
defendant who has cooled off in the period between the provoking incident and the 
act of killing is no longer in the heat of passion when the killing occurs. 
 
Other commentators refer to provocation as consisting of a subjective 
requirement and an objective requirement (or, in some cases, a descriptive 
component and an evaluative component).  Again, these elements map onto the 
requirements we refer to as heat of passion and adequate provocation.  Whether 
the defendant was in fact subject to the heat of passion at the time of the killing is 
commonly described as the doctrine’s subjective component, while the question of 
adequacy of provocation (usually by reference to whether a reasonable person 
would have been provoked) is referred to as the objective component.  We have 
chosen to use the heat of passion and adequate provocation terminology, rather 
than subjective and objective, for a number of reasons.  Heat of passion and 
adequate provocation are the more commonly used terms, and are more 
transparent and evocative of the requirements to which they refer.47   
 
In a recent article, Stephen Garvey describes the provocation defense as 
having three requirements, namely the adequate provocation requirement, the 
passion requirement, and the reasonable loss of self-control requirement.48  This 
classification of the elements of provocation, we suggest, is not the most useful 
way of analyzing the defense.  The third of Garvey’s requirements conflates two 
elements best kept separate—namely that the defendant actually lost self-control, 
and that this loss of self-control was reasonable.  Moreover, Garvey’s requirement 
that the defendant actually lost self-control is merely an alternate way of 
                                                 
43 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 777. 
44 LaFave defines adequate provocation as “a provocation which would cause a reasonable man to 
lose his normal self-control.”  Id. at 775. 
45 Id. at 776 (describing provocation as inducing “emotional disturbance (in earlier terminology, 
while in a ‘heat of passion’)”).   
46 To the extent that reasonable cooling off period is a separate requirement of provocation, it 
nonetheless ought not be treated as a central feature of the doctrine as not all jurisdictions limit 
provocation to circumstances in which a reasonable person would have not have had time to “cool 
down.”  See id. at 786.  
47 Using the terms “subjective” and “objective” for the requirements of provocation also runs the 
risk that we will be misunderstood as endorsing the view that justifications are purely objective 
while excuses are purely subjective—a view we do not hold. 
48 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1677.  Garvey describes these three requirements as 
constituting “the core elements of the defense itself.”  Id.  His list of the doctrine’s basic elements 
also includes the legal effect of the defense, “which is to mitigate, not exonerate.”  Id. 
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describing the passion requirement: the “passion” required for the defense to apply 
is emotion of a kind and to a degree that interferes with the defendant’s ability to 
exercise self-control.49  The requirement that this loss of self-control be reasonable 
is, likewise, simply another way of framing the requirement of adequate 
provocation: provocation is adequate if it would have provoked an “ordinary,” 
“reasonable,” or “average” person.50 
 
The most useful framework for understanding the elements of provocation 
is in terms of the dual requirements of heat of passion and adequate provocation.  
Together with the partial nature of the defense and its limitation to the offense of 
murder, these constitute the features that a theory of provocation must account for.  
Other rules that flesh out the doctrine are best understood as falling under the 
umbrella of either heat of passion or adequate provocation.51  We have 
deliberately chosen this nomenclature to be neutral with respect to the 
disagreement about what provocation counts as “adequate” and the precise 
relationship between the requisite emotional disturbance and self-control. 
 
2.  The Model Penal Code.— The Model Penal Code mitigates a killing 
from murder to manslaughter if it “occurred under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”52  
Eleven states currently have statutes containing this provision of the Code, in full 
or in part.53  While this provision has not been incorporated into state law to the 
same extent as some other parts of the Code, and some jurisdictions that enacted 
the Code’s formulation soon reverted to the common law version of provocation,54 
it is nonetheless a significant alternative to common law provocation. 
 
                                                 
49 While the requirement is often stated in terms of loss of self-control, this is misleading.  A better 
understanding of the required passion is that it impairs the defendant’s ability to conform his 
actions to the balance of reasons applicable in the circumstances, that the emotional disturbance 
makes it more difficult—but not impossible—to act in the correct manner.  The effect of passion on 
self-control is discussed in detail infra Part II.B. 
50 The appropriate standard is inconsistently described in the cases on provocation, with these terms 
and numerous others used interchangeable. See Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in 
Search of a Rationale, supra note 34, at 433.  We have therefore chosen to use “adequate 
provocation” as a way of describing this requirement while remaining agnostic as to whether the 
standard is that of an ordinary man rather than a reasonable man or a reasonable person, and so on. 
51 Other rules that flesh out these two essential features of provocation in at least some jurisdictions 
include the requirement that the provocation be sudden, that the provocation be more than mere 
words, that the provocation must consist of a wrong to the defendant rather than a third party; and 
that the emotion caused by the provocation must be anger or resentment.  See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 33, at 775-88; Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1687 n.35, 1689 n.38; 
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, supra note 34, at 432-
434. 
52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b). 
53 Nine states have enacted the Code’s formulation in full: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
104(a)(1); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a(a); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. §§ 
632(3), 641; Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 797-702(2), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
507.020(1)(a), 507.030(1)(b); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(1); New York, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.20(2), North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(2); and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 163.115(1)(a), 163.118(1)(b), 163.135.  Two states have enacted part of the extreme emotional 
disturbance provision: New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2; and Utah, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-205(1)(b). 
54 Dan Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269 (1996), at 323. 
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The “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (EMED) formulation 
represents a substantial reform of the provocation defense.  The EMED defense is 
not restricted to loss of self-control caused by passion stemming from adequate 
provocation.  The disturbance undermining self-control may be mental as well as 
emotional, and the emotional or mental disturbance need not arise from provoking 
conduct at all.55 When there is provocation, the EMED defense may apply 
regardless of whether the person killed was the provoker, or whether the 
provocation was directed at the defendant or a third party.  The Model Penal Code 
does require that the excuse or explanation for the actor’s distress be reasonable, 
but the reasonableness of the excuse or explanation is “determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he 
believed them to be.”56 
 
Because of these differences between the common law defense of 
provocation and the Model Penal Code’s EMED defense, the theory that best 
explains the features of common law provocation may not offer the best 
explanation for the EMED defense, and vice versa.  In this article, we present a 
theory of common law provocation, with a relatively brief discussion of the 
implications of this theory for the Model Penal Code’s EMED defense. 
 
 
II.  THEORIES OF PROVOCATION 
A. Overview of Defenses 
 
All commentators seem to agree that provocation is best conceptualized as 
a partial defense.57  (We call this the Partial Defense Thesis.) We agree.  
Provocation is not merely a mitigating factor relevant to determining the severity 
of a sentence; generally, it results in conviction for a separately denominated 
offense, namely voluntary manslaughter.58  Nor is provocation manslaughter 
merely a different offense from murder, like assault or involuntary manslaughter.  
As with other defenses such as insanity or self-defense, and unlike involuntary 
manslaughter or assault, a provoked killing satisfies all the elements of murder, but 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1690. 
56 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.3(1)(b). 
57 The term “defense” is used ambiguously in criminal law.  Broadly understood, a “defense” is any 
doctrine that precludes the defendant from being convicted.  For example, the principle that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of an offense in the absence of proof of every element in the offense 
definition is sometimes referred to as the “absent-element” or “failure of proof” defense. See, e.g., 
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 213-
216 (1982) (defenses consist of five sorts: absent-element defenses, offense modifications, 
justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW supra note 33 
(using the term “failure of proof” to refer to “absent-element” defenses).  However, this principle is 
better conceived as a normal rule of liability rather than as a defense properly understood.  See, e.g., 
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 41, at 379-380 (1997). We therefore use the term “defense” 
narrowly to mean doctrines that preclude conviction for an offense, due to the existence of 
extenuating circumstances, despite all the elements of the offense definition being satisfied.  The 
consensus among commentators is that provocation is a partial defense in this narrow sense of 
“defense.” 
58 In a small minority of states, the defense of provocation results in conviction for a lower degree 
of murder.  See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(1) (defining provocation as second degree murder); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(1)(d) (defining provocation as a felony of the second degree). 
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in circumstances that make a murder conviction inappropriate.  Unlike with 
complete defenses such as insanity or self-defense, where the extenuating 
circumstance is provocation, conviction for a lesser crime—voluntary 
manslaughter—is still appropriate, making the defense of provocation partial in 
nature. 
 
Most commentators, moreover, agree that there are three—and only 
three—basic species of defense: (1) justifications, (2) excuses, and (3) non-
exculpatory defenses.59  (We call this the Exhaustive Classification Thesis, and 
understand it to be capacious enough to allow for combinations of the basic 
forms.)  If this orthodox view is correct, provocation manslaughter would be a 
partial version of one or more of these types of defense.  No one believes that 
provocation is a non-exculpatory defense.  This category covers defenses related to 
public policy considerations independent of the culpability of the defendant, such 
as statutes of limitation for criminal prosecution.60  This leaves justification and 
excuse as the remaining candidates.  Almost everyone concludes—or, perhaps 
more accurately, assumes—that provocation must be in the nature of excuse (albeit 
partial) or in the nature of justification (albeit partial). 61  In the following section, 
we describe and critique the existing accounts of provocation, focusing primarily 
on the predominant view of partial excuse, but also addressing contrary views that 
claim provocation to be either a partial justification or (in denial of the exhaustive 
classification thesis) partial forms of neither justification nor excuse. 
 
B. Critical Overview of Existing Accounts of Provocation 
 
Over the years, criminal law theorists have contributed scores of accounts 
aimed to describe and rationally reformulate the theoretical underpinnings of 
provocation doctrine.  Some of these efforts are difficult or contestable to classify, 
for we often find ourselves resisting the author’s own characterization of her 
theory.  Our overview, then, proceeds as follows.  The dominant view is that 
provocation is a partial excuse.  If it is a partial excuse, then some sense must be 
made of the adequate provocation prong.  Roughly speaking, some partial excuse 
theorists believe that prong should be abandoned, some view it as requiring that 
the heat of passion itself be excused, the remainder view it as requiring that the 
heat of passion be justified.  A second position views provocation as partially 
justified.  A third view sees it as a combination of partial excuse and partial 
justification.  As best we can tell, this position has been endorsed by just two 
scholars over the past fifty years.  It is the view that this Article will develop and 
defend.  The final position rejects the excuse/justification framework.   
 
1.  Partial excuse.—The dominant view holds that provocation is in the 
nature of a partial excuse.62  As Timothy Macklem and John Gardner observe, “by 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, supra note 2, at 6 & n.8. 
60 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 448. 
61 There are notable exceptions to this position, theorists such as Kahan and Nussbaum, who claim 
provocation sounds in neither justification nor excuse.  We address these theories in Part II.B 
below. 
62 The most prominent advocate of a partial excuse rationale for provocation is Joshua Dressler.  
See generally Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, supra note 
34; Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002); Dressler, 
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common consent, provocation is a (partial) excuse for murderous actions.”63  
Partial excuse theories treat the heat of passion requirement as the key element of 
provocation doctrine.  The central idea is that heat of passion impairs a person’s 
agency.  A person who is affected by extreme anger finds it more difficult to 
exercise self-control than a person in a cooler emotional state.  Proponents of 
partial excuse theories of provocation refer to our “common experience”64 as 
demonstrating that anger undermines our ability to make appropriate choices, and 
therefore makes us “less able to respond in a legally and morally appropriate 
fashion.”65  A defendant who kills while under the influence of heat of passion is 
therefore considered less blameworthy than had the killing occurred when the 
defendant’s choice-making capabilities were unimpaired, and hence deserving of 
conviction of a lesser offense and the concomitant lesser punishment.  From this 
perspective, provocation manslaughter is a “concession to human frailty.”66  It is a 
concession to a particular kind of human frailty: our susceptibility to being 
overborne by strong emotions.  Like complete excuses such as insanity, the partial 
defense of provocation is premised upon respect for individuals as “choosing 
beings.”67  Provoked killers are entitled to lesser punishment because heat of 
passion diminishes a person’s choice-making capability. 
 
The phrase loss of self-control is commonly used to explain the effect of 
heat of passion.  This is misleading.  In provocation, the notion is that heat of 
passion interferes with, but does not completely destroy, an actor’s capacity to 
control conduct.  The claim is not that the provoked killer couldn’t control his 
conduct, but that in the circumstances such control was more difficult—
phenomenologically speaking.68  When a person is completely unable to control 
his behavior then the appropriate response, at least in principle, is to hold him 
criminally blameless—that is, to treat the person as completely excused.69  Heat of 
passion is a partial excuse because the actor’s choice-making capacities are so 
substantially undermined that it would be unfair to treat the actor as fully 
blameworthy, although his choice-making capacities are not completely 
extinguished.70 
                                                                                                                                       
Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, supra note 6.  Other accounts of provocation 
manslaughter that sound in partial excuse include Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications 
from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96 (1986); SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE 
KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE, 13-14 (1994); Uma Narayan & Andrew 
von Hirsch, Three Concepts of Provocation, in CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1996, at 18-19; 
Macklem & Gardner, supra note 8; Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, supra note 5. 
63 Macklem & Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism supra note 8, at 819. 
64 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 463. 
65 Id. at  464. 
66 The judgments and commentaries that refer to manslaughter are legion.  The most commonly 
cited early authorities include WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 191 (1791); R. v. 
Hayward, 6 C & P 157, 159 (1833) (“the law, in compassion to human infirmity, would hold the 
offence to amount to manslaughter only”); People v. Maher, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) (the law 
designates provocation as manslaughter “out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature”). 
67 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 24, 33 (1968). 
68 In the provocation manslaughter literature, self-control is generally understood as a 
psychological, experiential, or phenomenological concept, not as a contra-causal one.  Like other 
participants to the debate, we wish to bracket worries touching on the metaphysics of free-will.  
69 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 464. 
70 See, e.g., Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 62, at 983 (“It is precisely 
because we believe that the provoked party’s capacity for self-control is not completely undermined 
that the defense is partial.”). 
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We do not challenge this understanding of the relationships among anger, 
rational choice-making capacity, blameworthiness, and criminal liability. We 
accept: that anger can interfere with our abilities to make appropriate choices about 
conduct;71 that degree of control is relevant to moral blameworthiness; and that 
persons should not be punished in excess of what their blameworthiness 
warrants.72  Indeed, we accept that partial excuse provides a rationale for the 
provocation doctrine’s heat of passion requirement.  However, the orthodox view 
of provocation as partial excuse must also explain the doctrine’s adequate 
provocation requirement.  This has proven a more difficult task.   
 
Individual theories of provocation as partial excuse vary regarding the 
adequate provocation requirement.  Some theorists argue that the adequate 
provocation requirement should be abandoned, that heat of passion alone should 
suffice to reduce an offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter.   On this 
view, the only relevant enquiry is the subjective question of whether the defendant 
in fact had, to the requisite degree, lost self-control.73  Note that this position is 
similar to, but more extreme than, that of the MPC’s EMED defense, which 
“subjectivizes” (or “particularizes”), but does not eliminate, the requirement that 
the mental or emotional distress be reasonable.74 
 
                                                 
71 This is not to say that we accept it is natural to “lose control” in specific situations, such as a 
husband witnessing his wife’s adultery.  Contrast H.L.A. Hart’s statement that “common sense 
generalizations” about “human nature” tell us that men are “capable of self-control when 
confronted with an open till but not when confronted with a wife in adultery.”  HART, PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 67, at 33, quoted in Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 
1369.   Nor are we denying that our emotions themselves have a cognitive component, nor that 
people are often capable of restraint while under the influence of great anger.  See Kahan & 
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, supra note 54 (proposing the evaluative 
conception of emotion as superior to the mechanistic conception); Rozelle, Controlling Passion, 
supra note 9, at 225 (suggesting that “a policeman at the elbow” usually enables a person to control 
her actions, despite emotional turmoil).  None of these views is incompatible with the claim that 
heat of passion can make self-control more difficult.  Anyone who has been deeply wronged, or 
even cut off in traffic, will have experienced that maintaining self-control while angry requires 
greater psychic effort.  For a recent critique of the connection between capacity for self-control and 
criminal responsibility, see Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 149-159. 
72 The extent of the contemporary embrace of this last proposition, often running under the heading 
of “negative retributivism” or “side-constrained consequentialism,” is discussed in Mitchell N. 
Berman, Are We All Consequentialists Now?, in R.A. DUFF AND STUART GREEN, THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2010).  Of course, that undermined 
choice-capacity reduces blameworthiness and thus demands a reduction in criminal punishment, all 
else being equal, does not itself say anything about the class or title of offense for which one should 
be convicted.  As will be made plain below, we believe that undermined choice-capacity alone is 
not the best explanation or justification for treating a provoked killing as manslaughter rather than 
murder. 
73 See, e.g., J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (1st ed. 1965); Peter Brett, The 
Physiology of Provocation, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 634, 638; Alec Samuels, Excusable Loss of Self-
Control in Homicide, 34 MOD. L. REV. 163, 170 (1971); Jack K. Weber, Some Provoking Aspects 
of Voluntary Manslaughter Law, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 159, 160 (1981); Richard Singer, The 
Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 
B.C. L. REV. 243 (1986).     
74 Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1339-40; see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW, § 4.2.1, at 246 (1978). 
16 
Most contemporary scholars, however, including most proponents of 
partial excuse, resist this purely subjective approach. Most believe that the 
provocation defense ought not be available to all actors who killed while under the 
influence of heat of passion.  A defendant whose partial loss of control was 
brought about by a trivial slight deserves to be convicted of murder, not 
manslaughter.  The majority of partial excuse theorists therefore supports retaining 
the adequate provocation requirement, and generally argue that it properly serves 
to ensure the emotional state that undermines self-control is itself either excused or 
justified. 
 
(a) Excused emotion.  Joshua Dressler explains the adequate provocation 
requirement as ensuring that the defendant’s heat of passion (that is, the emotional 
state) is itself excused.75  According to Dressler: 
 
[P]rovocation is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based 
upon reduced choice-capacities.  If the doctrine is to be defensible, 
however, it must follow that the anger which undermines the 
choice-capability is itself formed under circumstances in which the 
actor cannot be fairly blamed for his anger.  Otherwise, we have a 
case of voluntary anger, no more morally deserving of mitigation 
than voluntary intoxication.76 
 
In Dressler’s view, provocation is excuse all the way down.  And for 
Dressler, the rationale for excuse is interference with choice.  Excuse generally 
involves situations where an actor is not blameworthy, or not fully blameworthy,77 
because the actor’s “ability to make meaningful choices is dramatically reduced.”78  
But if the actor is responsible for choosing an emotional state which makes control 
of conduct more difficult, we are entitled to blame the actor for the emotional 
state—and therefore to blame the actor for the wrongful conduct that eventuates.  
The actor is only entitled to mitigation when the actor’s emotional state is itself 
involuntary, by which Dressler means that “the actor’s choice-making capabilities 
have been so undermined that the actor cannot be justly blamed” for the emotional 
state.79 
 
                                                 
75 Dressler seems to have modified his views on this point in his more recent scholarship, but not to 
a degree that affects his underlying claim.  In his earlier work, Dressler expressly denied that anger 
resulting from adequate provocation was justified; it was merely blameless, that is, excused.  See 
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 465.  However, he has more recently 
admitted that some provocation entitles a person to feel anger, so that “we may characterize the 
emotion as, in some sense, justifiable.”  Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 
62, at 972.  But Dressler continues to insist that, while provoked anger may be justified, it need not 
be justified in order for provocation to apply.  In other words, that the anger be justified is not a 
requirement of the provocation defense; that the anger is “excusable” suffices.  Id. at 973. 
76 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 464.  That a person who has become 
voluntarily intoxicated cannot avoid responsibility for a criminal offence by arguing that he lacked 
the requisite mental state is an example of a forfeiture rule.  The defendant forfeits his claim 
because he voluntarily created the conditions that he is relying on to avoid blame.  Dressler’s 
approach is therefore sometimes described as treating the adequate provocation requirement as a 
forfeiture rule.  See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1709 & 1710 n.98.   
77 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 460. 
78 Id. at 461. 
79 Id. 
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The adequate provocation requirement fulfills the role of distinguishing 
between heat of passion for which the actor is to blame, and heat of passion for 
which the actor is excused.  The defendant is to blame for anger in the absence of 
adequate provocation—that is, if “the ordinary law-abiding person would not 
become angry [in that] particular provocative situation.”80  Thus, on Dressler’s 
account, whether a person chose to be angry is determined by whether an ordinary 
or reasonable person would have been angry in the relevant circumstances.  If an 
ordinary person would have been angry (that is, if there was reasonable 
provocation), then the actor is treated as not responsible for the anger, and 
therefore less blameworthy for the deadly conduct.  But if an ordinary person 
would not have been angry, then the actor is treated as becoming angry voluntarily, 
and is therefore completely blameworthy for the act of killing. 
 
We find this account implausible.  Assuming arguendo that we ought to 
draw a line between anger for which the actor is responsible, and anger for which 
the actor is not responsible, the requirement of adequate provocation does not 
achieve this distinction, for the correlation between whether an individual’s anger 
is voluntary (in Dressler’s sense of voluntary), and whether a reasonable person 
would have become angry in the same circumstances is simply too weak.  We all 
know people who are more easily angered than the average person (just as we 
know people with an unusually high ability to remain calm).81  To some extent, 
this may be due to a failure of will-power: we may say of such people that they 
indulge their anger.  But it is also surely due to those standing dispositions that we 
call character: resisting anger, and maintaining self-control, is simply more 
difficult for some people than others.  Now, the degree to which we are responsible 
for our own character, and therefore to blame for our bad character, is a difficult 
question.  We cannot adequately answer that question here.  Suffice it to say that 
our characters are formed by some combination of innate tendencies, upbringing, 
and choices we make about how we live and act.  While we bear some 
responsibility for our characters, they are not simply the product of our conscious 
choices.  The mere fact that a defendant was more easily angered than an ordinary 
person does not demonstrate that the defendant is more responsible, and therefore 
more blameworthy, for his anger. 
 
If we are concerned, as Dressler is, about whether a defendant is to blame 
for his or her emotions, the current doctrine’s inquiry into the adequacy of 
provocation is the wrong approach.  A more appropriate inquiry would look to 
whether the defendant had inculcated habits of emotional discipline, or had been 
subjected to inappropriate influences or trauma during his or her emotional 
development.  The adequate provocation requirement is simply not directed 
towards factors that distinguish between whether a defendant is to blame for his or 
her emotional state, and therefore whether the heat of passion experienced ought to 
be excused. 
 
(b) Justified emotion.  Some commentators who claim that provocation is a 
partial excuse explain the adequate provocation requirement by arguing that the 
                                                 
80 Id. at 464. 
81 The authors believe that at least one of them falls in the latter category. 
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defendant’s heat of passion is justified rather than excused.82  Scholars who take 
this approach argue that a person who kills in the heat of passion is entitled to have 
his act of killing partially excused only if his emotion – heat of passion – was 
justified.  Hence the requirement of adequate provocation: anger is justified only if 
it is in response to adequate provocation.  Anger in response to trivial provocation, 
or no provocation at all, is not justified. 
 
Despite the element of justified emotion, advocates of this approach 
characterize their accounts as excuse theories.83  Nonetheless, this approach 
concedes that while the usual conception of excuse due to loss of self-control can 
explain provocation’s heat of passion requirement, it cannot account for the 
adequate provocation requirement.  So the concept of justification is recruited, in a 
limited capacity, to fill this explanatory gap.  Justified emotion theorists seek to 
rely on excuse to explain the heat of passion requirement, and justification to 
explain the adequate provocation requirement.  But most justified emotion 
theorists insist that only the emotion is justified; they deny that the act of killing is 
even partially justified.84  By restricting the application of justification to the 
emotion, not the act, they claim to avoid two criticisms that their theories would 
otherwise attract – namely the charge that an act cannot be both partially excused 
and partially justified,85 and the claim that provoked killings should not be 
considered partially justified.86 
 
The difficulty for justified emotion theories of provocation is how to 
explain why, if the killing is partially excused (but still wrong) because the actor’s 
self-control is impaired, the defense is available only if the debilitating emotion 
was justified. A defendant hasn’t lost control to any lesser degree by virtue of the 
fact that his heat of passion was unwarranted in the circumstances.  To put it 
another way, if mitigation is available despite the fact that killing is entirely 
unjustified, why does the fact that the defendant’s emotion is unjustified preclude 
mitigation?  If a person who kills for the wrong reasons can receive mitigation, 
why not a person who gets angry for the wrong reason? 
Justified emotion theories fail to overcome this difficulty.  Despite being 
characterized as theories of (partial) excuse, they turn out not to be excuse theories 
at all – not on the traditional understanding of excuse. The partial loss of self-
control plays no role in theories of justified emotion: the role of anger is 
transformed from undermining volition to providing justified reasons for acting via 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, supra note 5, at 366-69; Macklem & Gardner, 
Provocation and Pluralism, supra note 8, at 819;SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: 
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 141 (1998); at 141; Pillsbury, 
Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 148n15;  Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 
8; HORDER, supra note 10 at 156, 160; von Hirsch and Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, 
supra note 8, at 248. 
83 See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1338 n40 (declaring that on her account, 
provocation “remains a partial excuse”). 
84 See, e.g., id. at 1394-95 (“It is by focusing on the emotion, rather than the act, that my proposal 
distinguishes itself quite easily (both in theory and practice) from the traditional model of 
provocation as partial justification.”); von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 8 at 248 (emphasizing that 
on their account of provocation, it is only the defendant’s “anger that is warranted, not the deed that 
results from it.”). 
85 See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1394. 
86 See, e.g., id. at 1395 & n.374. 
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its cognitive component.87  Justified emotion theories are in fact properly 
understood as theories of partial justification: under these theories, the act of 
killing should be understood as partially justified.  By invoking justified emotion, 
they explain the adequate provocation requirement – but only at the expense of no 
longer being able to explain the heat of passion requirement.   
 
On justified emotion accounts of provocation, all the mitigating work is 
done by the defendant’s reasons for acting.  The relevance of heat of passion is 
only that some instances of heat of passion embody a justified judgment – namely 
that the defendant has been grievously wronged.  The quantity or intensity of the 
emotion is irrelevant; interference with self-control plays no role.  Emotion per se 
is therefore unnecessary for a defendant to deserve the provocation defense, 
because she can hold the justified belief that she has been wronged in the absence 
of heat of passion.  Consider Parent, whose child has been killed by Villain.  
Justified emotion theories cannot distinguish between the case in which Parent 
kills Villain in the heat of passion after witnessing the killing, and the case in 
which Parent calmly kills Villain months later during Villain’s trial.  In both cases 
Parent can hold the same (justified) judgment that Villain committed a grave 
wrong against her (or her child), and kills for that reason.  The cognitive 
component of anger is not the only avenue through which one can have a justified 
belief that one has been seriously wronged.  One can have that belief – and be 
justified in having that belief – in the absence of emotion.  Justified emotion 
theories consequently provide no rationale for restricting the provocation defense 
to cases in which the heat of passion requirement is satisfied. 
 
2.  A heretical view: partial justification.—A small handful of scholars 
reject the orthodox view and argue that provocation functions as a partial 
justification.88  In contrast to the views so far discussed, partial justification 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1390 (arguing that the adequately 
provoked defendant’s “excuse” is provided by “the reasons for the emotion,” and hence the 
“reasons why the defendants claim they have killed,” not “[t]he quantity or intensity of the 
emotion.”) (emphasis in original); Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 143 
(“I disagree that emotionally-related cognitive dysfunction should mitigate punishment regardless 
of reasons for emotion.”); Macklem & Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism, supra note 8, at 819-
20 (arguing that in making the partial excuse of provocation, the defendant admits his action was 
unjustified, but relies on the fact that the “cognitive component” of his anger was justified).  
Macklem and Gardner’s theory of provocation has many nuances, and draws on Gardner’s complex 
and non-traditional theory of defenses that he presented in two earlier papers.  See John Gardner, 
The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1998); John Gardner, Justification and 
Reasons, in A.P. SIMESTER & A.T.H. SMITH, HARM AND CULPABILITY (1996), at 119.  A full 
analysis of this theory is beyond the scope of this paper.  For present purposes, it is enough to 
observe that Macklem and Gardner’s theory of provocation cannot account for the heat of passion 
requirement. 
88 The most prominent supporter of this view is Finbarr McAuley.  See Finbarr McAuley, 
Anticipating the Past: The Defense of Provocation in Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 150 (1987) 
(concluding that “provocation functions is a partial justification rather than a partial excuse”); 
Finbarr McAuley, The Theory of Justification and Excuse: Some Italian Lessons, 35 AM. J. 
COMPARATIVE LAW 359 (1987).  Some commentators have argued that, while provocation in its 
current form is not a partial justification, it should be.  See, e.g., Rozelle, Controlling Passion, 
supra note 9, at 200 (proposing a reform of provocation that would permit the defense “only to 
those defendants who were legally entitled to use some amount of force when they were killed”).  
Douglas Brown recently attributed a partial justification theory to the Law Commission of 
England’s 2003 report on partial defenses.  Douglas J. Brown, Disentangling Concessions to 
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theories argue that a provoked killing warrants mitigation because such a killing is 
less wrong than an unprovoked killing.  These theorists also argue that partial 
justification is the only rationale for provocation: that is, that partial justification 
alone explains all the elements of the provocation doctrine. 
 
Partial justification as a rationale for provocation has been subjected to two 
sets of criticisms.  The first set of criticisms rejects the claim that provoked killings 
are partially justified.89  These criticisms include the claim that the notion of partial 
justification is incoherent, and alternatively that provocation cannot be a partial 
justification because provoked killings are just as wrong as unprovoked killings.  
As the presentation of our own account (in Parts III and IV) will make clear, we 
disagree with the substance of these criticisms: on our view, an adequately 
provoked killing is less wrong than the paradigm intentional killing.  Importantly, 
however, we agree with the critics that existing proponents of the partial 
justification conception have not adequately defended this pivotal claim.90   We 
aim to do better in Part IV, where we defend our thesis against objections. 
 
The second set of criticisms is that, while partial justification theories can 
explain the adequate provocation requirement, they fail to explain the heat of 
passion requirement.91  We agree.  Restricting the provocation defense to killing in 
the heat of passion cannot be explained on the basis of partial justification.  Indeed, 
Finbarr McAuley, the most prominent proponent of the partial justification 
approach admits as much.  McAuley declares that on a partial justification theory 
of provocation, “a defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial 
                                                                                                                                       
Human Frailty: Making Sense of Anglo-American Provocation Doctrine Through Comparative 
Study, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 675, 695 (2007), referring to LAW COMM’N, PARTIAL 
DEFENSES TO MURDER: FINAL REPORT (LAW. COM. NO. 290), 2004, Cm. 6301 (2004).  This 
attribution is dubious.  The Law Commission do not explicitly endorse any theory in the Report, 
but the best reading of their position is as a justified-emotion version of partial excuse.  They say, 
e.g., that provocation requires that “the defendant’s sense of being wronged should have been 
justified.” Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  They do not say that the act should have been justified. 
89 See our discussion in Sections IV.B. and IV.C. below. 
90 McAuley’s argument rests rather squarely on the fact that mitigation manslaughter is unavailable 
for the “loss of control brought on by panic or bad news, ” McAuley, Anticipating the Past, supra 
note 88, at 137.  Of course, this is just the starting point of the inquiry, acknowledged by all 
commentators.  Yet, from this observation, McAuley requires only one paragraph to reach his 
conclusion: “Thus while the defence of provocation may well be a concession to the natural human 
failings that are the lot of every defendant, it is submitted that its true basis is to be found in the 
contribution of the victim, in the fact that his wrongful conduct was the cause of the defendant’s 
violent outburst.”  Id.  McAuley never makes clear why the contribution by the victim is the 
defense’s “true basis” given his acknowledgement that the defense is a contribution to human 
frailty, and his earlier recognition “that there are natural limits to an individual’s capacity for self-
control which the law cannot afford to ignore.” Id. at 136.  McAuley seems to rely on equating the 
requirement of adequate provocation with wrongful conduct on the part of the deceased.  
Provocation is adequate, says McAuley, if it “was sufficiently grave to override the ordinary 
powers of human resistance.”  Id. at 137.  He further submits that “any conduct which is likely to 
produce [a violent response] is wrong in the relevant sense.” Id. at 138.  From this, McAuley 
concludes that the provocation defence “implies that the defendant was partially justified in 
reacting as he did because of the untoward conduct of his victim.”  Id. at 139.  But McAuley 
provides no argument whatsoever for how or why the untoward conduct of the victim partially 
justifies the defendant’s actions, which is, of course, the crucial step in establishing the theoretical 
bona fides of a theory of partial justification.  
91 See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1694, 1697; Dressler, Rethinking Heat of 
Passion, supra note 34, at 458. 
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provocation should, on this ground alone, be entitled to the defence.”92  Whatever 
the merits or demerits of McAuley’s position as a matter of reform, to the extent 
that he is purporting to provide a descriptive theory of provocation, his statement 
amounts to an admission of defeat.  A theory of provocation that cannot explain 
the heat of passion requirement fails to describe the doctrine of provocation in its 
current form.  Moreover, we will argue in Section III.B that substantial 
considerations do in fact support the doctrine in its current form. 
 
3. Partial justification and partial excuse.— A handful of theorists prior us 
have flirted with the idea of treating provocation as both a partial excuse and a 
partial justification.93  This is not surprising, given the routine acknowledgement 
by members of the academy that provocation exhibits the appearance of both 
excusatory and justificatory elements.94  But even these scholars stop well short of 
providing a theoretical rationale for (or even fully endorsing) provocation as partial 
excuse and partial justification.95  We know of only one descriptive theory of 
provocation based on the view that a provoked killing is properly considered both 
partially excused and partially justified: that of English scholar Andrew 
Ashworth.96  But not even Ashworth provides a comprehensive rationale for and 
defense of the hybrid position. 
 
In an article written during the provocation debate’s infancy, Ashworth 
contends that “the doctrine of provocation . . . rests just as much on notions of 
                                                 
92 McAuley, Anticipating the Past, supra note 88.  McAuley nonetheless states that, “Undoubtedly, 
a defendant who kills after he has regained his composure, or when the effects of the provocation 
have more or less worn off, is not entitled to the defence.” Id. (emphasis added).  The reason for 
this restriction, McAuley claims, is that the composed killer “can hardly claim that it was the 
provocation which caused his violent outburst.”  Id.  This strikes us as untenable.  Recall the case of 
Parent, who calmly Villain, the murderer of Parent’s child, after a significant time has elapsed.  It 
seems perfectly sensible for Parent to claim that Villain’s wrongful conduct was the cause of her 
violent response. 
93 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTROOM 227-28 (2003) (arguing that neither justification nor excuse alone can explain both the 
heat of passion and adequate provocation requirements); Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators, 
supra note 4, at 418 (asserting that “the partial defense of provocation includes elements of both 
excusatory and justificatory rationales”). 
94 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
95 Lee asserts that treating a provoked killing as partially justified is “morally objectionable” and 
concludes that, “Provocation is best understood as a partial excuse, but its justificatory elements 
should not be ignored.” LEE, supra note 93, at 229.  Bergelson, for her part, describes the dual 
characteristics of provocation as the result of the ad hoc nature of common law development, rather 
than the basis for a coherent and cohesive rationale.  Bergelson, supra note 4, at 412-13. 
96 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland has recently proposed that provocation should be 
treated as containing both excusatory and justificatory elements. See The Law Reform Commission 
of Ireland, Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation, LRC CP 27-2003, 141.  But 
the Commission argues that provocation ought to be reformed as a combination of partial excuse 
and partial justification; it does not argue that provocation as is currently stands is best understood 
according to a hybrid theory.  Additionally, the Paper fails to provide any theoretical framework for 
the hybrid view, or any rebuttal of the contrary views. Indeed, the Committee’s understanding of 
the justification-excuse debate – which they describe as having “taken on a somewhat forbidding 
theoretical character,” id. at 21 – is shaky at best.  The Consultation Paper contains the curious 
claim that “the view that the doctrine of provocation rests just as much on notions of partial 
justification as upon the excusing element of loss of self-control” is “the more settled and accepted 
academic position on the matter.”  Id. at 23.  In sum, the Consultation Paper adds little to the debate 
about the theoretical rationale of the provocation defense. 
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justification as upon the excusing element of loss of self-control.”97  He endorses 
“the claim implicit in partial justification [] that an individual is to some extent 
morally justified in making a punitive return against someone who intentionally 
causes him serious offence, and that this serves to differentiate someone who is 
provoked to lose his self-control and kill from the unprovoked killer.”98 Ashworth 
believes the union of the two rationales “is no mere historical accident,”99 and that 
the loss of either aspect would have “significant disadvantages.”100 
 
Despite his endorsement of a dual rationale, however, Ashworth does not 
give a detailed theoretical framework for the defense as both partial excuse and 
partial justification.  He says relatively little about what it means for an action to 
be partially justified, or about how the partial excuse and partial justification 
components of the rationale are reconciled.  In other words, Ashworth’s article 
does not address most of the reasons American scholars give for rejecting a 
combined rationale for provocation – namely that excuse and justification are 
mutually exclusive, and that partial justification is an incoherent notion.  That 
Ashworth does not address these critiques is hardly Ashworth’s fault, as his article 
was written prior to those positions being advanced.  The search for a legitimate 
rationale for provocation did not capture the imagination of American scholars 
until the early 1980s.101  More surprising is the fact that scholars on this side of the 
Atlantic have largely failed to engage with Ashworth’s substantive claim. While 
American authors regularly cite Ashworth’s article, they have just as regularly 
failed to directly address Ashworth’s position.  For example, Dressler refers to 
Ashworth’s piece as “among the best English scholarly articles on provocation,”102 
yet surprisingly fails to acknowledge Ashworth’s position when he rejects a “dual 
rationalization of a partial defense which is both justification and excuse based.”103  
Rather than engaging with Ashworth’s view, most scholars have simply repeated 
the “traditional view” that partial excuse and partial justification are mutually 
exclusive.  The view that provocation is both a partial excuse and a partial 
justification therefore remains in need of a theoretical framework, as well as in 
need of refutations of the criticisms that have regularly been leveled at the view 
since Ashworth’s article. 
 
4.  Rejecting the justification/excuse framework.— All the theories we have 
so far addressed treat provocation as either a partial excuse or a partial 
justification, in keeping with the exhaustive classification thesis.  At least two 
                                                 
97 Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, supra note 3, at 307. 
98 Id.  It is worth noting that even Ashworth hedges his bets (or at least provides an argument in the 
alternative).  He asserts that the adequate provocation requirement “may also be supported by 
causal reasoning.” Id. at 308.  This is the idea that if the provocation was slight, the true cause of 
the heat of passion and consequent killing is the defendant’s bad character. Id.  This position is akin 
to Dressler’s argument that the adequate provocation requirement acts as a forfeiture rule.  See our 
discussion of Dressler’s partial excuse theory in Part II.B.1 above.  This presumably explains why 
Ashworth is sometimes characterized as an advocate of provocation as partial excuse.  See, e.g., 
Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1682 n.22, 1710 n.98. 
99 Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, supra note 3, at 307. 
100 Id. at 317. 
101 See Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 424 n.24 (noting the remarkable lack 
of interest in the issue and the fact that “[w]hat interest has been demonstrated is largely found in 
British circles.”).   
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 439. 
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theories reject this approach: Garvey’s theory of provocation as “akrasia,”104 and 
Kahan and Nussbaum’s approach based on the “evaluative theory of emotion.”105  
According to these views, provocation is grounded in neither justification nor 
excuse.  
 
(a) Provocation as akrasia.  Garvey proposes to explain the provocation 
defense by invoking the concept of weakness of will: what the ancient Greeks 
referred to as akrasia.  He begins by distinguishing between “two very different 
ways”106 in which a person can violate an obligation imposed by the criminal law.  
First, he can defy the law: he can wholeheartedly choose to commit an illegal 
act,107 with “full knowledge of the law and full consent of the will.”108  Second, he 
can violate a legal obligation, not by defying it, but merely as a result of weakness 
of will: despite wanting to obey the law, he succumbs to temptation.  He violates 
the law “without wholeheartedly embracing the law-breaking desire that his will 
translates into action.”109  The explanation for the provocation defense, says 
Garvey, is that it “distinguish[es] actors who kill in defiance of the law from those 
who do not.”110  If an actor kills in defiance of the law, he is guilty of murder.  But 
if he kills due to weakness of will, he is guilty only of manslaughter.111 
 
We find Garvey’s account of provocation, though nuanced and original, 
unsatisfactory for three reasons.  First, the account is underspecified: Garvey does 
not clearly explain why the akratic killer deserves mitigation.  Second, the 
explanation that appears most consistent with Garvey’s other claims, and therefore 
most plausibly attributed to him, seemingly commits him to views about the in-
principle scope of appropriate mitigation that few commentators are likely to 
accept.  Third, insofar as Garvey and others do believe that, in principle, mitigation 
should be extended far more broadly than we think it ought to be, the pragmatic 
grounds he gives for limiting mitigation as a matter of doctrine are unpersuasive. 
 
To start, Garvey does not flesh out an argument for why the akratic killer 
deserves less punishment than the defiant killer.  His article provides some hints as 
to what the reason for mitigation might be, but none of the reasons is satisfying.  
Garvey refers to the defiant actor’s “excessive pride or hubris”112—but punishing 
more severely for hubris amounts to punishing character, a position Garvey 
emphatically rejects.113  Alternatively, the actions of the non-defiant, ambivalent 
actor might be less wrongful than the actions of the defiant actor.  This could be 
plausible—but only in circumstances where the actor’s ambivalence is due to 
having some morally relevant reasons (other than self-interest, for instance) for 
being tempted to violate the law.  Garvey does not present such limits on the 
circumstances of non-wholehearted lawbreaking.  If he did, his account would 
collapse into a theory of partial justification. 
                                                 
104 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38. 
105 Kahan & Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, supra note 54. 
106 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1727. 
107 Id. at 1727. 
108 Id. at 1728 (emphasis in original). 
109 Id. at 1729. 
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Garvey comes closest to explaining why the akratic killer deserves 
mitigation when he declares that, “In the end, the culpability of an actor guilty of 
manslaughter consists in his failure to exercise his capacity for self-control.”114  
From this perspective, Garvey’s theory seems best understood as a broad version 
of partial excuse.  On this view, all failed attempts to exercise self-control deserve 
substantial mitigation—not merely those failures that are due to particular 
circumstances that make the exercise of self-control more difficult. 
 
If this is Garvey’s explanation for why the akratic killer deserves mitigation, 
however, its implications are bracing.  A violation of a duty imposed by the 
criminal law is akratic if it occurs “in a moment of weakness,” if the actor has a 
desire to violate the law, but also a simultaneous (but lesser) desire to conform to 
the law.115  This ambivalence, we suggest, describes a large number of criminal 
violations – perhaps even the majority of crimes, and certainly crimes for which 
substantial mitigation is neither currently available nor, we believe, morally 
deserved.  Garvey’s akratic account would apply, for instance, to every thief who 
steals because his desire for an object of value outweighs his weaker desire to 
adhere to the law, or to every sex offender who recognizes his sexual urges are 
unlawful and unsuccessfully attempts to resist them.  It would apply, in short, to 
every failure to resist temptation. 
 
Perhaps, however, the mistake is ours.  Perhaps all akratic intentional 
killers are, in principle, entitled to the same degree of mitigation as that presently 
afforded, under provocation manslaughter doctrine, to just a small subset.  If so, 
however, it would seem at first blush that Garvey’s analysis would amount, not to 
a defense of existing doctrine, but to a repudiation of it.  That is, on Garvey’s 
analysis, the key features of voluntary manslaughter doctrine—namely, heat of 
passion and adequate provocation—would seem indefensible, for an actor can 
struggle with the competing desires to kill and to abide by the law without being 
subject to either heat of passion or provoking conduct.   
 
Garvey resists this conclusion.  Acknowledging that “the passion and 
adequate provocation requirements might appear superfluous,”116 he argues that 
they do play a role – as “evidentiary rules.” 117  That is, the requirements of heat of 
passion and adequate provocation have evidentiary, but not operative significance.  
While akratic intentional killers who do not satisfy these twin requirements are, as 
a class, no more blameworthy than those who do, these requirements serve to 
identify (albeit imperfectly) those who are in fact akratic. 
 
As it happens, we have considerable sympathy for the impulse to rethink 
seemingly operative rules of criminal law in evidentiary terms.118  But we believe 
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116 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1733. 
117 Id. (emphasis in original). 
118 One of us has written at length on this theme.  See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in JOHN 
DEIGH & DAVID DOLINKO, EDS., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
(forthcoming 2010) (arguing that the conditional threat in blackmail, the harm requirement in 
offenses of recklessness, and the peculiar contours of affirmative duties to act, can all be explained 
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that the requirements of heat of passion and adequate provocation are such poor 
proxies for the fact of akrasia as to make it radically implausible that their function 
is evidentiary.  Garvey argues that, “The akrasia theory denies the defense to the 
inadequately provoked actor . . . because his claim to have lost self-control is 
incredible.”119  In our view, the EMED case law demonstrates that this is not so: 
the adequacy of provocation is an exceedingly poor proxy for whether someone 
has in fact experienced substantial impairment of control.120  More importantly, 
substantial impairment of control is itself a poor proxy for an akratic killing.  
Consider Garvey’s own euthanasia example.121  Suppose Terminally Ill, who is 
suffering enormous pain, pleads with Friend to end her life.  We can easily 
imagine Friend believing that killing is wrong and desiring not to do wrong, but 
desiring more strongly to implement Terminally Ill’s wishes and put an end to her 
suffering.   A killing in these circumstances would clearly qualify as akratic, a 
conclusion that seems quite easy to reach notwithstanding the absence of both heat 
of passion and adequate provocation.  For these reasons, then, we remain quite 
skeptical of Garvey’s effort to link his akratic theory of mitigation with anything 
approximating existing provocation doctrine. 
 
(b)  The evaluative conception of emotion.  Dan Kahan and Martha 
Nussbaum also propose a theory of provocation that rejects the categories of 
justification and excuse.  They rightly observe that the “most popular account”122 
of provocation manslaughter is that a person who kills in anger has limited 
culpability because his choice capacities have been partially undermined.123  
Kahan and Nussbaum reject this orthodox account of provocation as partial excuse 
for the same reasons we do.  They assert that it “fails to make sense of the most 
basic requirement of the common law formulation: that the defendant’s passion 
arise from a provocation by the victim.”124  On a traditional theory of partial 
excuse, this limitation is inexplicable because an actor’s culpability ought to be 
reduced whenever his choice capacities have been impaired, regardless of the 
impairment’s cause.125 
 
Kahan and Nussbaum argue instead that provoked killers deserve 
mitigation because their emotions express “cognitive appraisals” that are morally 
appropriate, that reflect an appropriate evaluation of the good.126  Their account of 
provocation therefore mirrors the justified emotion theories addressed above, in 
which the defense is deserved when the “cognitive component” of the provoked 
                                                                                                                                       
in evidentiary terms); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives 
Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (1998). 
119 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1735. 
120 See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8 (cataloguing many cases of 
“intimate homicide” in which the defendant apparently suffered genuine impairment of control as a 
result of trivial, nominal, or non-existent provocation). 
121 Garvey describes an “actor who kills in order to relieve the suffering of an terminally ill friend.” 
Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1698. 
122 Kahan & Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, supra note 54, at 305. 
123 Id. (citing Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 467). 
124 Id. at 306. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 315. 
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killer’s anger is justified.127  Consequently, Kahan and Nussbaum’s theory has the 
same fatal flaw as the justified emotion theories: it cannot account for the 
requirement of heat of passion.  Kahan and Nussbaum purport to explain the heat 
of passion requirement by arguing that it is only when a person kills in the heat of 
passion that he can be said to act on worthy motives and judgments.  Without heat 
of passion, they claim, “it would be impossible to understand the defendant’s act as 
expressing an appropriate valuation of the good—whether it is the defendant’s 
honor or the dignity or physical security of the defendant’s family members—that 
is threatened by the victim’s wrongful provocation.”128 
 
This does not ring true to us.  Consider the case of Parent killing Villain, 
who has murdered Parent’s child (or Kahan and Nussbaum’s similar example of a 
mother who kills the man who sexually assaulted her daughter).  We can imagine 
Parent deciding to kill Villain precisely because she values her (or her child’s) 
honor, and values the security of her family members, and perhaps also because 
she values the security of Villain’s potential future victims.  We can imagine a 
killing for these motives, which Kahan and Nussbaum accept as worthy, even 
when Parent dispassionately kills.  A period of time may have passed, during 
which Parent’s passion turned to grief and sorrow or fear of future attacks. 
 
The euthanasia case of Friend killing Terminally Ill also provides a 
counterexample to Kahan and Nussbaum’s claim that a person can only be said to 
kill on worthy motives if they are experiencing the heat of passion. Friend has 
appropriate beliefs and valuations regarding human suffering, even if Friend is not 
experiencing anger or rage.  On Kahan and Nussbaum’s view, it is the judgment or 
evaluation expressed by rage that does all the work.  Emotions do express 
judgments, but the requisite worthy motives, judgments and evaluations can exist 
in the absence of anger or rage.  Kahan and Nussbaum’s theory therefore cannot 
explain why the heat of passion is required for a defendant to benefit from the 
provocation defense. 
 
 
III. OUR ACCOUNT: PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION AND PARTIAL EXCUSE 
 
So far we have considered the various theories that scholars have advanced 
to explain the doctrine of provocation, and we have found each of them wanting.  
The orthodox view of provocation as a partial excuse cannot account for the 
doctrinal requirement of adequate provocation.  The heretical view that 
provocation is a partial justification cannot explain the requirement that the killing 
occur in the heat of passion.  Other views that reject (or purport to reject) the 
traditional justification-excuse framework either fail to explain all the elements of 
provocation, or collapse into a partial justification theory, or prove implausible for 
other reasons. 
 
For our part, we accept that neither partial excuse nor partial justification 
alone can account for all the central elements of the provocation doctrine.  But we 
                                                 
127 See supra notes 82 - 87 and accompanying text.  As with justified emotion theories, we believe 
that Kahan and Nussbaum’s theory of provocation is in truth a theory of partial justification.  See 
also Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1722 (2005); see generally id. at 1718-22. 
128 Kahan & Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, supra note 54, at 315. 
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do not consequently reject partial excuse and partial justification from the field of 
explaining provocation.  Quite the contrary.  We consider both partial excuse and 
partial justification as components of the rationale underlying provocation. 
 
The short version of our theory is this: partial excuse and partial 
justification each provide independent grounds for mitigation.  But the mitigation 
that flows from partial excuse alone is insufficient to warrant treating an 
intentional killing as manslaughter rather than murder.  Ditto the mitigation that 
flows purely from partial justification.  However, when an intentional killing is 
both partially excused and partially justified, it is appropriate to treat the killing as 
manslaughter.  Hence the provocation defense’s dual requirements of heat of 
passion and adequate provocation: they ensure the defense is only available to 
those defendants whose killing was both partially excused (because it occurred in 
the heat of passion) and partially justified (because it was in response to adequate 
provocation). 
 
We present our account in stages.  In the remainder of Part III, we provide 
a brief description of our theory.  We sketch our arguments for (1) the claim that 
partial excuse and partial justification represent dual grounds for mitigation, and 
(2) the claim that the provocation defense is rightly reserved for the conjunction of 
partial excuse and partial justification.  We elaborate on this account in Part IV, in 
the course of responding to objections that the unorthodox aspects of our account 
are sure to attract. 
 
A.  Dual Grounds for Mitigation 
 
1.  Less blameworthy due to emotion.—The fact that an actor who 
intentionally kills another was in an inflamed emotional state, which made it more 
difficult for him to conform his actions to the dictates of the balance of applicable 
reasons, makes him less blameworthy than he would otherwise be.  This claim is 
just the common wisdom that undergirds the dominant partial-excuse position on 
provocation.  We shall therefore spend relatively little time defending it.  But we 
wish to be clear on the scope of the claim: it is a claim merely about mitigation.  
We are not claiming that the fact that an actor was experiencing emotional turmoil, 
without more, supports a conviction for manslaughter, or that a theory based on 
partial loss of self-control explains all the elements of the doctrine of provocation.  
We simply claim that the existence of emotional turmoil of a kind that undermines 
the actor’s capacity to conform his actions to those dictated by the applicable 
guiding reasons deserves some mitigation. 
 
The Raguseo case provides an example.  The defendant, who was 
meticulous about his vehicle and parking space, became increasingly angered by 
repeated unauthorized use of the space.  In an argument with a man who had used 
his parking space and almost hit his car, the defendant became enraged stabbed the 
victim to death.  However unreasonable the defendant’s rage and violence, we can 
easily see that this unreasonable rage could have undermined his capacity to 
control himself.  He does not deserve a manslaughter conviction as a result of this.  
But he does deserve some mitigation.  He deserves less punishment than would be 
due had he killed the victim while in full control of his rational faculties. 
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An example is also provided by the infamous case of Commonwealth v. 
Carr,129 in which the defendant shot two women, killing one, and claimed that he 
became enraged at the sight of their “lesbian lovemaking”130 in the woods.  On our 
account, Carr is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction.  But he is less 
blameworthy than would be a close cousin who coolly and calmly kills women for 
engaging in lesbian lovemaking.  Let us be clear: Carr is not entitled to mitigation 
relative to the “ordinary” or baseline murderer.  But this is not because Carr’s loss 
of control has no mitigating bearing on his blameworthiness.  Carr’s loss of control 
mitigates, but the cause of his loss of control – his attitude towards his victims – 
exacerbates his blameworthiness.  Although these things cannot be measured with 
any accuracy, the net effect of the mitigating and exacerbating factors might be 
that Carr deserves roughly the same punishment as the “ordinary murderer.”  
Relative to the cool, collected murderer who kills lesbians out of hatred, however, 
Carr does deserve lesser punishment – to some degree.  That is because the cool, 
collected murder is of exacerbated blameworthiness relative to the supposed norm 
for the class of intentional killers,131 but does not have any offsetting mitigation 
due to loss of control.  Relative to that murderer, Carr’s loss of control is 
(somewhat) mitigating. 
 
The amount of punishment deserved in inadequate provocation cases, 
however, is not solely a function of the extent to which his faculty of rational self-
control were impaired by strong emotion.  We fully agree with Kahan and 
Nussbaum that the evaluations that undergird the loss of self-control are also 
relevant.  A comparison of Carr and Raguseo illustrates this.  Assuming each was 
in a similarly compromised emotional state, Ragueso is less blameworthy because 
his anger is rooted in excessive evaluation of his property, whereas Carr’s is rooted 
in actual hatred of a class of persons. 
 
2.  Less wrongful due to reasons for acting.—The fact that an actor had a 
good reason for aggressing against his victim renders an intentional killing less 
wrongful that it would have been absent that reason, notwithstanding that the 
killing remains wrongful on balance.  Killing in response to adequate provocation 
is wrong—seriously wrong, and deserving of heavy punishment.  But it is less 
wrong, all else being equal, than killing in the absence of provocation. 
 
We are aware that this claim is treated as morally repugnant by many of the 
critics of partial justification,132 but we believe it nonetheless true.  We provide a 
more rigorous rationale and defense of the claim in Part IV.  For now, we provide 
just the rudiments—enough to establish the claim’s plausibility. 
 
When we refer to intentional killings for which the actor had good reason 
to aggress against his victim, we mean to refer, roughly, to intentional killings in 
retaliation for the types of grievous wrongs that would be uncontroversially 
accepted as adequate provocation.  Intentional killings of this kind remain 
                                                 
129 580 A. 2d at 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
130 Id. 
131 This is why penalty enhancement for hate crimes is defensible in principle. 
132 Put briefly, the usual criticism is that treating a provoked killing as less wrong is tantamount to 
either treating the victim as partly to blame for his own death, or treating the victim’s life as less 
valuable than that of a victim who did not provoke his killer.   
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wrongful.  But wrongfulness admits of degrees.  It is a commonplace of criminal 
law and of morality that not all wrongs are created equal.  Some wrongs are more 
(or less) wrongful than others.  The complex schemas of stratified punishments for 
different criminal offenses reflect this basic fact that wrongs vary in degree.   
 
That an intentional killing was in response to a grievous wrong is one of 
the factors that render it less wrongful.  To illustrate the point, recall the case of 
Parent.  Parent discovers that Villain has murdered Parent’s child, and intentionally 
kills Villain.  Parent’s killing of Villain is wrong, but it is less wrong than, say, a 
garden-variety killing for financial gain.  We suspect most readers’ intuitions will 
concur on this.  Parent’s action is less wrong precisely because of Parent’s reasons 
for killing Villain—reasons that issue from the fact that Villain had seriously 
wronged Parent by killing Parent’s child.  Note that these reasons (whatever, 
precisely, they may be)133 are independent of Parent’s emotional state.  They apply 
both in cases where Parent kills while (understandably) in a state of great anger 
and emotional turmoil, and in cases where parent kills coolly and calmly.  In order 
to properly isolate the reasons why Parent’s killing is less wrong (and to avoid the 
possibility that our intuitive reactions are unduly colored by assuming that Parent 
is in emotional turmoil), let us refine the circumstances we are presenting.  
Suppose Parent coolly kills Villain two years after Villain’s killing of Child and 
after having painstakingly tracked him across the country. Surely we would say 
that such a killing, while wrong—and perhaps so wrong that Parent ought to be 
convicted of murder—is nevertheless less wrong than it would be had Villain not 
subjected Parent (or Parent’s child) to a grievous wrong.  It is less wrong than a 
killing of Villain by some unrelated third party.  And it is less wrong than was 
Villain’s killing of Child.  Surely we would say that Parent deserves a lesser 
sentence as a consequence of her reason for killing Villain.  The fact that Villain 
killed Parent’s child provided Parent with reasons to retaliate against Villain, and 
those reasons lessened (without eliminating) the wrongfulness of Parent’s killing 
of Villain. 
 
If this is the correct understanding of cases of this sort, then the actor’s 
reason for killing partially reduces the wrongfulness of the killing.  But recall that 
a reason which completely reduces the wrongfulness of an action (that is, that 
renders the act not wrongful) is a justification.  It therefore seems sensible to 
characterize a reason that merely reduces the wrongfulness of an act as a partial 
justification, and to characterize the less wrongful act as partially justified.  In Part 
IV, we will consider at length a number of arguments to the effect that the notion 
of partial justification is incoherent.  We believe these arguments are flawed, or at 
the very least, overstated.  But there is nothing magical about the language of 
partial justification. Our substantive point is that adequately provoked killings are 
less wrong than those that are not so provoked. 
 
B.  The Conjunction Requirement. 
 
If what we have said so far is correct—that partial excuse and partial 
justification each independently provide mitigation—the next task is to explain 
why provocation should require both elements.  Why shouldn’t heat of passion and 
                                                 
133 A matter explored in some greater detail in Section IV.C, infra. 
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adequate provocation each be sufficient, instead of necessary, conditions for 
provocation, at least so long as the mitigating force of either is adequate, in the 
particular case, to reach some threshold?  We provide two explanations.  We call 
the first response the “additive-proxy account,” and the second the “expressive-
deterrent account.”  They are not mutually exclusive. 
 
1. The additive-proxy account.—A defendant who intentionally killed 
under conditions that give rise to a partial excuse—when his emotional turmoil 
substantially interfered with his capacity for self-control—merits some amount of 
mitigation.  A defendant who intentionally killed in conditions that give rise to a 
justification—he was grievously wronged and so had reason to retaliate—also 
deserves a degree of mitigation.  But what should we say of the defendant who was 
subject to both excusing conditions and justifying conditions?134  Surely we should 
say that such a defendant deserves more mitigation than he would if only the 
partially-excusing condition or partially-justifying condition applied.  That is, the 
mitigation that flows from partial excuse and partial justification is cumulative. 
 
In general, the mitigation due a defendant whose conduct is partly excused 
will be insufficient to warrant such a reduction in penalty that would result from a 
conviction of manslaughter rather than murder.  The same applies to a defendant 
whose conduct is partly justified.  In each case, some mitigation in sentencing will 
be appropriate, but the sentence should nonetheless be higher than the maximum 
sentence available for manslaughter in most states.  The Table we have included as 
an Appendix lists the sentence ranges for murder and provocation manslaughter in 
each of the fifty states.  As this Table shows, jurisdictions have adopted widely 
varying sentencing ranges for both manslaughter and murder.  Nonetheless, in the 
majority of states the maximum penalty for manslaughter is less than or equal to 
the minimum penalty available for murder (and often less by a large margin).135  In 
almost all jurisdictions, a manslaughter conviction lowers both the floor and the 
ceiling of available punishment by a significant degree from that available for a 
murder conviction.  As a general matter, a defendant who has intentionally killed 
will only deserve a sentence in this lower range if the killing was both partially 
excused and partially justified.  
 
We can readily make sense of the cumulative mitigating effect of partial 
justification and partial excuse.  A partial justification reduces the wrongfulness of 
an action, and a partial excuse reduces the degree of blame the actor deserves for 
                                                 
134 Whatever may be said of the incompatibility of a claim of excuse and a claim of justification (a 
topic we address in Part IV), it is clear that excusing conditions do not necessarily exclude 
justifying conditions.  Nothing in the nature of the conditions that give rise to excuse prevents the 
simultaneous existence of conditions that give rise to justification.  To borrow a term from Kent 
Greenawalt, it is possible for the elements of excuse and justification to “coalesce.”  Greenawalt, 
Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, supra note 62, at 96, 103.  This is true at both the level 
of complete defenses and partial defenses.  An insane person may kill in self-defense.  See Douglas 
Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, 24 L. & PHIL. 557, 576 (2005).  
Similarly, a person under the influence of extreme anger can have reason to retaliate violently. 
135 For example, the penalty range for provocation manslaughter in Colorado is 3–6 years (or 5–12 
years if aggravated), whereas the penalty for murder is life.  See Appendix.  Other states in which 
the minimum penalty for murder is significantly higher than the maximum penalty for 
manslaughter include Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and New Jersey.  Id. 
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the (less wrongful) conduct.  Each of these reductions affects the amount of 
punishment the actor deserves.  Consider once again the case of Parent.  We have 
already contended that if Parent kills Villain calmly and deliberately, he has 
committed a lesser wrong and so deserves less punishment than if he did not have 
this reason for killing Villain.  Now consider the case in which Parent sees Villain 
murder his child, and kills Villain in a fit of extreme rage.  We should surely say 
that Parent deserves less punishment in this case than in the case where Parent kills 
while in full control of his rational faculties. 
 
This strikes us as a plausible way to view partial justification and partial 
excuse.  Intuitively, it seems correct that, ceteris paribus, a partially justified 
killing in the heat of passion deserves less punishment than a partially justified 
killing that is coldly deliberate, and also less punishment than an entirely 
unjustified killing committed in the heat of extreme reason-clouding passion.  
 
While Dressler has described this approach as “torturous,”136 we think it 
quite natural.  There is something quite common-sensical about the idea that an 
actor with both a partial excuse and a partial justification deserves some mitigation 
as a result of each.  The results of this structure or reasoning conform to our 
intuitions about which intentional killings deserve greater mitigation than others, 
i.e. about which intentional killings deserve enough mitigation to warrant the 
substantially lower range of penalties available for manslaughter.  The dual 
requirements of provocation—heat of passion and adequate provocation—deny 
this lower penalty range both to the person who exacts cold-blooded revenge for a 
grievous wrong and the person who kills in genuine heat of passion triggered by a 
trivial slight.  In each of these cases, some mitigation in sentencing is warranted, 
but not that associated with the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
 
The better objection to a doctrine that limits provocation manslaughter to 
cases in which the defendant not only had some good reason to do as he did (but 
not, we emphasize again, “good reason” all things considered) but was also in an 
emotional state that substantially interfered with his ability to conform his conduct 
to the balance of reasons, does not deny that partial justification and partial excuse 
can aggregate in the way we have just described.  Rather, it questions why the 
criminal law should require that each type of mitigation be present instead of 
demanding only that some specified quantum of mitigation be satisfied, while 
allowing that that total might be reached by excusatory considerations alone, 
partially justifying considerations alone, or an aggregation of the two.   
 
We do not deny that partial excuses and partial justifications vary in 
degree, and that in some extreme cases either basis of mitigation alone would 
diminish the actor’s blameworthiness as much as, or even more than, do the two 
forms of mitigation combined in a typical case of provocation manslaughter.  To 
make this concrete, consider the Australian case of Scriva.137 The defendant in that 
case saw his child seriously injured by an automobile driver.  In the heat of 
passion, the defendant attacked the driver.  When a bystander intervened, the 
defendant intentionally stabbed him.  Dressler argues that the defendant was 
                                                 
136 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 439. 
137 [1951] V.L.R. 298. 
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“sufficiently enraged or otherwise overwrought” to deserve to be punished for 
manslaughter only.138  We do not deny that a manslaughter-level sentence might be 
entirely appropriate on the facts of Scriva. 
 
The short response to the objection, however, is that legal doctrine need 
not, and frequently does not, perfectly correspond to its underlying moral 
considerations.139  Cases (perhaps including Scriva) where the requisite degree of 
mitigation could be realized as a result only of partial excuse—or only from partial 
justification—will be rare.  In most cases where a defendant is sufficiently enraged 
to warrant a manslaughter sentence, for example, he will also have some reason 
that partially justifies his actions.  In the vast majority of cases where the only 
mitigating condition is partial excuse, the defendant will not warrant a sentence in 
the manslaughter range.  The combination of partial justification and partial excuse 
is a decent proxy for the level of mitigation that warrants such a lower sentence.  It 
is therefore sensible for the law to require both, even at the expense of some 
underinclusiveness.   
 
This is especially true because an alternative approach that would more 
perfectly track the moral analysis would incur real costs.  To start, there is the 
formidable legal drafting problem of trying to articulate the total quantum of 
mitigation required to move from murder to manslaughter.  Furthermore, allowing 
partial excuse alone to suffice for manslaughter runs the opposite risk of allowing 
partially-excused intentional killers to be punished too lightly.  We have in mind 
cases such as Commonwealth v. Carr,140 killings in response to homosexual 
advance,141 and multitude of cases of intimate homicide in which the victim has 
done little or nothing to provoke the attack.142  Indeed, we suggest that the 
tendency for provocation arguments to succeed in such cases is partly caused by 
too much emphasis having been placed on the partial excuse dimension of 
provocation, at the expense of the requirement of partial justification.  As a result 
there has been a trend towards the partial loss of self-control aspect of provocation 
overshadowing the requirement of adequate provocation.  The Model Penal Code 
is part of this trend, with the partial justification aspect of the provocation defense 
minimized (if not eliminated) in its EMED incarnation.  As Nourse has effectively 
demonstrated, this has resulted in the EMED defense being more often 
successfully argued in undeserving cases of intimate violence than its common law 
predecessor. 
 
2. The expressive-deterrent account.—Another approach views each 
element of provocation as necessary, but not simply because they combine to 
provide a sufficient magnitude of mitigation.  On this approach, heat of passion 
and adequate provocation are both necessary, but for different reasons.  Adequate 
                                                 
138 Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Excuse or Partial Justification, supra note 6.). 
139 Although a commonplace, this point is overlooked with surprising frequency.  For an 
exploration of some of the pitfalls of forgetting this simple point, see Mitchell N. Berman, On the 
Moral Structure of White Collar Crime, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 301, 315-27 (2007). 
140 580 A.2d 1362, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
141 See, e.g., Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter, supra note 4. 
142 See generally Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8; Rozelle, Controlling Passion, supra 
note 9. 
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provocation is required for expressive reasons, while heat of passion is required 
principally for reasons of deterrence. 
 
This perspective emphasizes—and helps to explain—an element of the 
provocation defense to which we have paid relatively little attention until now.  
Provocation is a partial defense: it does not merely provide for sentencing 
mitigation, nor even result in a lesser degree of murder.  It does not simply support 
a range of punishment with lower maximums and minimums.  The provocation 
doctrine carves out a separate offense—voluntary manslaughter—for expressive 
reasons. Sentence aside, a murder conviction expresses a greater degree of moral 
condemnation than a conviction for manslaughter.143 
 
It is plausible to think that manslaughter is meant to mark conduct that is 
different in kind from murder.144  A defendant who intentionally kills with great 
partial excuse, but without good reason (i.e. without adequate provocation), might 
deserve significantly reduced punishment.  But that is because he is less to blame 
for an act that is no less wrongful than a paradigm murder.  His intentional killing 
is not a different type of—that is, less wrongful—act.  His partially-excusing 
condition does not alter the quality of his act, just the degree to which he is to 
blame for it.  By imposing the stigma of “murder” on a partially-excused 
intentional killing, the law maintains its maximum expressive condemnation of the 
act of intentionally killing (without substantial supporting reasons), while the 
mitigation the defendant deserves is provided by imposing a sentence at the very 
low end of the range available for murder.145  By providing a different offense 
category that carries less stigma—that communicates a lesser degree of 
condemnation—when the defendant is adequately provoked, the law 
communicates that the relevant conduct itself is less wrongful. 
 
But if the category of manslaughter corresponds to less wrongful killings, 
and less wrongfulness is established by the existence of adequate provocation, then 
why does the provocation defense also require that the killing occur in the heat of 
passion?  The answer to this question draws out the asymmetry of this approach.  
Heat of passion is required for different reasons than adequate provocation.  While 
the latter is required for expressive reasons, the former is required principally for 
reasons of deterrence.  A lesser offense of manslaughter with only the requirement 
                                                 
143 A murder conviction with a sentence of twenty years, for instance, expresses greater moral 
condemnation than a conviction for manslaughter with a twenty year sentence.  For a general 
discussion of the expressive function of law, see, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of 
Punishment, in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 95-118 (1970). 
144 This is consistent with the historical narrative Horder presents.  See Part I, supra. 
145 This reasoning suggests that the ideal sentencing scheme for homicide would have some overlap 
between murder and manslaughter.  That is, ideally the minimum sentence available for murder 
should be equal to or slightly lower than the maximum available for manslaughter.  This is because 
some defendants with a partial excuse of great magnitude that warrants a sentence in the 
manslaughter range, but for expressive reasons should be convicted of murder.  This is perhaps the 
best way to think of cases such as Scriva: such defendants should have their actions branded as 
murder, but deserve a sentence in the high end of the manslaughter range.  Approximately half the 
states use this model.  In nine states the sentencing range for manslaughter is contiguous with the 
sentencing range for murder (that is, the manslaughter maximum is the same as the murder 
minimum).  There is overlap between the manslaughter and murder ranges (with the manslaughter 
maximum higher than the murder minimum) in a further seven states.  See Appendix. 
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of adequate provocation runs the risk of incentivizing retaliatory killing.  A person 
who has been grievously wronged may make the cold cost-benefit calculation that 
conviction for manslaughter (and the accompanying lesser punishment) is a price 
he’s willing to pay in order to exact vengeance on his wrongdoer.  The case of 
Ellie Nesler provides a telling illustration.  Nesler fatally shot the man accused of 
molesting her son while the man sat in a California court.146  The California judge 
in her trial found that “she had known the penalty for manslaughter before she 
killed [the victim] and had been prepared to accept it.”147  Such reasoning is far 
less likely if a partial justification, by itself, is relevant only to mitigate a sentence 
for murder.  Even if the minimum sentence is as low as, or lower than, the 
maximum for manslaughter, a wronged person contemplating killing in retaliation 
could not guarantee that he will receive a sentence at the low end of the murder 
range.  The applicable punishment therefore remains a punishment for wrongful 
conduct, rather than merely the price of acting in a certain way.  Restricting 
manslaughter to situations in which both partial excuse and partial justification 
apply ensures that those who are unable to convince a factfinder that they killed in 
the heat of passion will not have their possible punishment capped at the maximum 
sentence available for manslaughter, and therefore would risk a substantially 
greater punishment.148 
 
To restate this latter point, the criminal justice system is, in its fundamental 
self-conception, a system of sanctions, not prices—that is, a system that threatens 
and imposes penalties for prohibited conduct, rather than exacting charges for 
permitted conduct.149  While it is true that the system’s addressees sometimes treat 
the threatened sanctions as mere prices (this is a problem that bedevils corporate 
criminal law, for example), that is an inversion that the penal department of the 
legal system cannot condone.  The limitation of manslaughter, with its reduced 
maximum penalties and its less condemnatory expressive force, to cases in which 
provoked killers act in the heat of passion and not as a result of a cool cost-benefit 
calculation, is necessary to help maintain the integrity of criminal law as a 
prohibitory and condemnatory system of social control. 
 
 
IV. OBJECTIONS AND ELABORATION 
 
The partial excuse aspect of our account reflects common wisdom about 
provocation manslaughter.  The novelty of our account concerns the role we assign 
to what we call partial justification.  We expect, therefore, that most objections to 
our account will target that aspect of our theory.  In this Part, we consider three 
potential objections: first, that justifications and excuses are mutually exclusive 
                                                 
146 Mother in Courtroom Slaying Calls Jail Term Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994. 
147 Id. 
148 A risk remains that a wronged person might believe he could convince a court that he acted in 
the heat of passion, and therefore conduct his cost-benefit analysis on this basis.  But there are 
doctrinal protections against this.  For example, one of the rules that falls under the heat of passion 
element is the requirement (in most states) that there must not have been a lapse in time sufficient 
to give the defendant reasonable time to cool down.  This is best understood as an evidentiary rule 
which, while it may exclude some genuine claims of heat of passion, is justified by the extent to 
which it guards against false claims of heat of passion. 
149 For the classic discussion of the distinction, see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
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and therefore cannot be combined in the fashion we propose; second, that the 
notion of partial justification is incoherent or misguided; and third, that to 
intentionally kill someone in the face even of extraordinary provocation is not less 
wrongful than to intentionally kill someone absent such provocation.   
 
To each of these three objections we offer a different type of response.  The 
mutual exclusivity objection, we argue, is just plain mistaken.  There are no good 
reasons to doubt that a doctrine of the criminal law can combine elements of both 
justification and excuse.  Somewhat more can be said to support resistance to the 
concept of partial justification.  Nonetheless, we will argue that there are good 
reasons to favor it.  More importantly, though, we also explain that absolutely 
nothing of substance about our account would be lost were that particular 
nomenclature abandoned.  The substance and originality of our account are fully 
preserved if the notion of “lesser wrongfulness” is substituted for that of “partial 
justification.” Finally, in support of our contention that the adequately-provoked 
killing is less wrongful than it would be absent the provocation, ceteris paribus, we 
offer something in the spirit of what Robert Nozick termed a “philosophical 
explanation.” 150 That is, we do not present an argument that purports to decisively 
establish that such a killing is less wrongful.  Rather, we give an explanation of 
how such a killing could be less wrongful.  In other words, we set out what 
propositions both about the nature of wrongfulness and about the reasons for 
killing under provocation could be true that would vindicate our claim.  We 
anticipate that many readers (most, we hope) will find this explanation congenial 
and probable.  But we offer no arguments to bludgeon into acceptance those who 
do not.  Instead, we suggest, such readers have reason to reject standard 
provocation manslaughter doctrine, either by scrapping it altogether or replacing it 
with rules that are better understood purely in the nature of partial excuse, like the 
MPC’s doctrine of “extreme mental or emotional distress,” broadly understood and 
applied.  The final section of this Part highlights additional aspects or implications 
of our account that warrant explicit attention. 
 
A. Partial  Justifications and Partial Excuses are Not Mutually Exclusive 
 
Despite the appearance of both partial-justification- and partial-excuse-
related criteria in the doctrine of provocation, criminal law scholars have 
overwhelmingly been reluctant to treat provocation as a combination of partial 
justification and partial excuse.151  Many considerations contribute to this 
reluctance, but the single factor with greatest explanatory force, we believe, is the 
widespread belief that justification and excuse are mutually exclusive. As Doug 
Husak recently declared, “[c]riminal law theorists believe—with almost no 
exception” that justifications are incompatible with excuses.152  Notice that this is a 
claim about the compatibility of complete justification and complete excuse, not 
about the compatibility of partial justification and partial excuse.  A great deal of 
mistaken thinking about provocation has flowed from insufficient attention being 
paid to the difference between the claim that the complete defenses are mutually 
exclusive, and the claim that the partial defenses are mutually exclusive.  Only the 
latter claim is incompatible with our account of provocation as a combination of 
                                                 
150 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 8-11 (1981). 
151 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
152 Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, supra note 134, at 561. 
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partial justification and partial excuse.  But perhaps due to a failure to fully 
appreciate the consequences of the move from complete to partial defenses, the 
bulk of provocation theorists simply cite the claim that complete excuse and 
justification are incompatible as the reason why provocation cannot be explained 
by a combination of partial excuse and partial justification.153  That is, the mutual 
exclusivity of partial justification and partial excuse is treated as synonymous 
with, or at least entailed by, the mutual exclusivity of complete justification and 
excuse.  As it happens, there are good reasons to be skeptical even of the 
widespread belief that complete justification and excuse are incompatible.154 But 
even if we assume arguendo that complete excuse and justification are mutually 
exclusive, it is not the case that the partial defenses are mutually exclusive.  The 
considerations upon which the incompatibility of the complete excuses is founded 
simply do not apply to partial defenses. 
 
Complete excuse and justification are considered mutually exclusive 
because the existence of wrongdoing is taken to be a necessary component of 
excuse, and justification entails that no wrong has been done.  Mutual exclusivity 
is routinely written into the definitions of justification and excuse.  J.L. Austin, 
who started the whole Sisyphean ball rolling, stated that to claim a justification is 
to “accept responsibility but deny that it was bad.”155  To plead an excuse is to 
“admit that it was bad but [not to] accept responsibility.”156  The phalanx of 
scholars that has since addressed the issue have followed Austin’s lead, at least to 
the extent of uniformly defining excuses as admitting that there was wrongful 
conduct (as variously conceptualized), but denying responsibility.  Dressler speaks 
for the general view, then, in his oft-cited passage framing the mutual exclusivity 
of justification and excuse as a definitional matter: “It must be remembered that 
ordinarily a defense cannot properly be viewed simultaneously as a justification 
and an excuse because the latter, by definition, admits to the existence of social 
harm.”157 
                                                 
153 See, e.g., Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation, supra note 5, at 19 (declaring that a long series 
of cases “reflect a longstanding rationale as to why heat of passion is an excuse, and thus not a 
justification”) (emphasis added); Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1394 (“Traditionally, 
‘excuse’ and ‘justification’ have been viewed as mutually exclusive categories: a defendant cannot 
be both excused and justified because an excused action presupposes that the action was wrong and 
therefore unjustified.”).  Both Fontaine and Nourse cite Dressler as authority for the view that the 
mutual exclusivity of justification and excuse precludes a combined theory of provocation.  
Dressler claimed that, “It must be remembered that ordinarily a defense cannot be properly viewed 
simultaneously as a justification and an excuse because the latter, by definition, admits to the 
existence of social harm.”  Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 439. Note that 
Dressler claims only that complete justification and excuse are mutually exclusive.  In the next 
sentence (not regularly quoted by later scholars) Dressler admits that, “It is possible, though not 
easy, to imagine a dual rationalization of a partial defense which is both justification and excuse 
based.”  Id.  Greenawalt, by contrast, claims that the partial versions of justification and excuse are 
mutually exclusive.  Greenwalt, Distinguishing Justifications and Excuses, supra note 62, at 96. 
154 Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, supra note 134 (arguing that 
justification does not have “priority” over excuse, which necessarily means that justification and 
excuse are not mutually exclusive). 
155 Austin, A Plea for Excuses, reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 20. 
156 Id. 
157 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 438.  Note that Dressler follows 
Robinson in equating the wrong in unjustified conduct as social harm.  See generally, Paul H. 
Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). We address this view in Part IV.B infra. 
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But while fully justified conduct is not wrongful (or not criminal, or not 
warranted or permissible, depending on your conception of justification), partially 
justified conduct is wrongful.  It is less wrongful than the same conduct would be 
were the justifying condition not present, but it is still all-things-considered wrong. 
And since it is all-things-considered wrong, there is no contradiction involved in 
claiming either a partial or complete excuse in addition to a partial justification – 
because claiming a partial justification admits to the existence of a wrong (albeit a 
lesser wrong than in the absence of the partial justification). 
 
Imperfect self-defense provides an example outside the realm of 
provocation.  Suppose a person is confronted with an attack involving signification 
but non-deadly force, and responds in defense with unreasonable and 
disproportionate force, killing his attacker.   This is plausibly understood as 
conduct that is partially justified.158  Invoking our conception of partial 
justification, we would say that the defender had a reason to act as he did (to avoid 
being significantly harmed), but had weightier reasons not to act as he did (the 
obligation not to kill outweighs his legitimate interest in protecting himself from 
harm substantially less than death).  His conduct was not (on the whole) warranted 
or justified, but it was partially justified.  This accords with our intuitions that such 
conduct is wrongful homicide, but of less gravity than a premeditated killing for 
financial gain. 
 
Given the residual wrongfulness of partially justified conduct, there is no 
contradiction in also claiming an excuse, either partial or complete.  Suppose our 
killer in excessive self-defense is insane.  It is perfectly coherent for him to raise 
self-defense as a complete excuse in order to avoid blame for the (lesser or 
residual) wrongfulness of his conduct.  She would be fully excused in relation to 
this (lesser) wrong. 
 
A possible response at this juncture would be to point out that, if the 
defendant has a complete excuse, there is no need to claim a partial justification 
because the complete excuse will preclude liability even for a charge not 
ameliorated by the partial justification.159   But this response is not available to 
deny combining partial justification with partial excuse.  Imagine that our 
defendant who killed using excessive force in self-defense was beside himself with 
rage at the time: the violent but non-deadly attack occurred during an extremely 
heated argument.  Let us assume that this rage did in fact interfere with his 
capacity to exercise self-control, and this contributed to the excessiveness of his 
response.  We now have both partially justifying and partially excusing conditions 
present.  Though partially justified, his conduct was still wrong (but less wrong 
than had there been no attack at all).  And though partially excused from blame for 
his wrong conduct, he is still partially to blame for this wrongful conduct.  It 
involves no contradiction to say that partial justification reduces the wrongfulness 
of the conduct, and also that partial excuse reduces the degree of blame for the 
                                                 
158 See Rozelle, Controlling Passion, supra note 9, at 255. 
159 Husak responds wryly to the argument from need: “We should not be too quick to conclude that 
persons cannot have a given kind of defense simply because they do not need one.  I may need my 
umbrella only if it rains, but I have one nonetheless.  Why can’t excuses be like umbrellas?”  
Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, supra note 134, at 567. 
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(residual or comparatively lesser) conduct.  As we argued in Part III.B., the 
mitigation associated with partial justification and partial excuse is cumulative. 
 
 
As the concepts of partial excuse and justification are not inherently (or 
necessarily, or conceptually) incompatible, some further argument is required to 
justify dismissing out of hand a combined rationale for the provocation defense.  
We know of no such additional arguments other than those that reject the notion of 
partial justification – arguments to which we now turn. 
 
B.  Partial Justification is a Coherent Notion 
 
A common reason for rejecting a combined rationale in favor of an excuse 
theory of provocation is the view that the notion of partial justification is either 
incoherent or morally repugnant.  As such, partial justification can neither play a 
role in a combined rationale for provocation, nor provide a rationale for 
provocation in its own right.  The only remaining option, so this thinking goes, is 
that provocation is a partial excuse.  Hence the result that partial excuse has 
become the dominant rationale for provocation. 
 
The arguments for rejecting partial justification fall into two categories, 
with the second group consisting of two sub-categories.  First, theorists have 
asserted that the concept of partial justification is incoherent.  Second, the various 
conceptions of partial justification160 have been criticized as either (a) conceptually 
contradictory, or (b) morally insupportable. 
 
1. Partial justification as a contradiction in terms.—Many scholars have 
asserted that “partial justification” is a contradiction in terms.  Justification on this 
view is like a light switch: it is either on or off.  Something is either justified or it 
isn’t.  As justification is a binary concept, admitting of no degrees, it makes no 
sense to say that conduct is partially justified.  Garvey provides a recent example 
of this position: 
 
The concept of a “partial justification” is puzzling.  A justified action 
is usually understood to mean an action one is (at least) permitted to 
do, and any particular action can be described as either permissible or 
impermissible.  But it makes no sense to say a particular action is 
“partially permitted”.  The logic of permission is all-or-nothing.161 
 
Greenawalt has expressed similar concerns: “The conceptual difficulty is that the 
term justification has an either-or quality that makes people hesitant to speak of a 
partial justification when no aspect of the action is fully justified.”162The 
conceptual difficulty is overstated.  To be sure, the term “justification”—when 
unmodified—has an either-or quality.  This does not entail, however, that 
modifying the term amounts to contradicting it.  The unmodified terms “full” and 
                                                 
160 Husak, Partial Defenses, supra note 2, at 170. 
161 Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1693 n.57.  To be fair, Garvey seems to view this 
puzzle to be merely one of nomenclature and therefore easily resolved by renaming partial 
justification theories as “lesser wrong theories.  Id. 
162 Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, supra note 62, at 92. 
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“empty” have an either-or quality about them: to say a vessel is “full” is to declare 
it completely full; to say a vessel is “empty” is to declare it completely empty.  The 
logic of fullness and emptiness, it seems, is quite literally all-or-nothing.  Yet 
people are not at all hesitant to refer to a glass as either half-full or half-empty.  
Nor do we have any difficulty understanding what is meant by these phrases when 
they’re uttered.163 
 
The same point can be made regarding the term “wrong.”  When wielded 
without modification, “wrong” has a binary connotation.  But no-one would deny 
that the concept of wrongfulness admits of degrees.164  Wrongful actions can `be 
more and less wrongful. 
 
2. Uniacke and the Incoherence of Partial Justification.—At the risk of 
belaboring the point more than half to death, we ought to directly address the 
position of Suzanne Uniacke.  She is the scholar most regularly cited as advocating 
the view that the concept of partial justification is incoherent,165 and her position 
on partial justification is both nuanced and interesting.  Uniacke states that, “I do 
not think that the concept of a partial justification for a particular act or offense 
makes sense.”166  At the same time, she admits that “Justification can be a matter 
of degree.”167  How does Uniacke reconcile these two claims?   
 
On Uniacke’s view, when we choose between labeling an action “justified” 
or “unjustified,” we make an overall evaluation of that act.168  If an act is justified, 
it can be more or less justified.  That is, among the set of overall-justified act, some 
are better—more justified—than others.   (One may be justified in repelling an 
unwanted kiss from a persistent would-be paramour by either pushing him away or 
slapping him on the cheek.  But, if pushing him away will get the message across, 
this is more justified than slapping him.) 
 
                                                 
163 Of course, some terms cannot sensibly be modified in this way.  It is not the case, for instance, 
that some animals are more equal than others.  
164 Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, supra note 134; Douglas N. Husak, 
Partial Defenses, supra note 2.  The term “right” is a little more difficult.  While there is clearly a 
gradation of behavior ranging from barely permissible through deserving of approval to heroic, we 
do not normally describe these are more or less right—although we can certainly say that some 
morally (or legally) rights acts are better or more preferable than others.  Nonetheless, the 
asymmetry between “right” and “wrong” may explain Garvey’s hesitation in calling conduct 
partially permitted.  But as Garvey himself points out, whatever the linguistic hesitation, the notion 
of partial justification makes sense as making conduct less wrongful, but still impermissible.  
Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1693.  (Garvey uses the phrase “just as impermissible,” 
which adds an unnecessary layer of confusion, given he has just asserted that “the logic of 
permission is all-or-nothing.” Id.) 
165 See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1693 n.57; Husak, Partial Defenses, supra 
note 2, at 171 n.24.  
166 UNIACKE, supra note 62, at 15-16 n.8. 
167 Id. 
168 Id.  One of us has challenged this idea elsewhere, arguing instead that the demanding and giving 
of justifications display a dialectical structure, such that to label an act “justified” (fully, not 
partially) usually signifies only that it is not rendered impermissible by the particular considerations 
invoked (explicitly or implicitly) against it.  Thus, one need not normally warrant that the act is all-
things-considered permissible by deeming it “justified.”  See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and 
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 262-66 (2008).  Our analysis of provocation does not depend upon 
this “tailored” conception of justification.   
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However, all unjustified acts are simply that—unjustified.  Uniacke’s point 
seems to be that while justification can be a matter of degree, unjustification 
cannot.169  Moreover, calling an act “partially justified,” according to Uniacke, 
expresses the judgment that the act falls within the set of overall justified acts.  But 
acts to which the provocation defense applies are overall unjustified.  So, to call 
provoked killings partially justified is to contradict the law’s overall assessment of 
such killings as wrong, and deserving of serious punishment.   
 
This is a plausible view of the linguistic implications of “justified” and 
“unjustified.”  However, it is not the only plausible view.  It is also plausible to 
view “partially justified” as indicating that an act is supported by some good 
reasons, but not enough to make the act overall justified.  But we feel no need to 
insist that our linguistic preferences should trump those of Uniacke and others.  
We believe the term “partially justified” is a particularly efficacious way of 
describing the moral status of provoked killings, but “less wrong” also suffices.  
Nothing of substance in our position turns in this change in nomenclature, and 
nothing in Uniacke’s approach denies that overall-unjustified acts can be more or 
less wrong. 
 
3. Conceptions of Partial Justification.—The arguments we have just 
addressed purport to establish that the concept of partial justification is incoherent.  
We have shown that there are reasons to reject these arguments.  But it is also 
worth noting that these arguments are primarily linguistic.  Because of this, the 
thrust of the arguments is easily parried by simply replacing the term “partially 
justified” with “less wrongful.”  Nothing of substance is lost as a result of the 
change in nomenclature. 
 
Another approach used to reject partial justification is to argue that the 
particular conceptions advanced to explain partial justification in the context of 
provocation cannot be supported.  Dressler, the chief antagonist of provocation as 
partial justification, identifies three theories that have been advanced to explain 
partial justification: (i) the “rights theory”; (ii) the “forfeiture theory”; and (iii) the 
“lesser harm” theory.  He argues that each of them fails—either because they are 
conceptually incoherent, or because they are morally unacceptable.170  Dressler 
approaches the task of identifying theories of partial justification by first isolating 
the theories that have been posited as explaining full justification, and then 
considering when these theories are translated into partial defenses. 
 
According to the rights theory, “it is sometimes morally justifiable to 
enforce a legal and moral right by taking the life of another.”171  This is at least 
plausible as a rationale for self-defense:  you are entitled to enforce your right to 
life by taking the life of your attacker.172  As a basis for partial justification 
                                                 
169 Id.  at 15-16 n.8. 
170 Theories of partial justification are moral theories, because they are theories about degree of 
wrongfulness of actions. 
171 Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, supra note 6, at 477. 
172 Note that, stated in this form, the justification does not necessarily depend on wrongdoing by the 
person killed.  Your right to life can be accidentally violated (by a person sleepwalking, or 
hypnotized, etc.).  In killing an innocent attacker, you are nonetheless enforcing your right to life—
or, more precisely, your negative right not to be killed.  
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Dressler criticizes this theory on two counts.  First, whatever right is being 
protecting when one is provoked is less than the right to life, as ex hypothesi one’s 
life is not endangered by the provoking conduct (else one could avail oneself of 
self-defense).  It must be some lesser right being protected, in which case it is 
difficult to see why one is morally entitled to take another’s life (and so violate a 
greater right).  As Dressler puts it, “it should certainly come as a surprise to us that 
such a right entitles the actor to take a human life to enforce it.”173 
 
Dressler’s second criticism is that, if the actor has a right that he is entitled 
to enforce by killing his provoker, we are left with a puzzle as to why provocation 
is a partial rather than a complete defense.174  The same criticism has been leveled 
at the so-called partial-right doctrine of imperfect self-defense, namely that to say 
someone has a partial right is a contradiction in terms.175  Dressler therefore claims 
that, as a rationale for the partial defense of provocation, the “rights theory” is both 
a conceptual and moral failure. 
 
We feel no desire to defend the rights thesis.  It suffices to point out that 
our theory of partial justification indeed denies that the adequately provoked 
person has the right to kill.  He does not have such a right, which is why he is 
guilty of murder—or of manslaughter, if he is also partially excused.  His wrongful 
conduct (in which he violates the right to life of his provocateur) is simply less 
wrongful than it would have been had he not been supplied with some reasons to 
kill as a result of the provocation.176 
 
Whereas the “rights theory” proposes that the killer has a right to kill the 
“forfeiture theory” proposes that the victim does not have the right to life.  The 
victim forfeits his life by choosing to engage in wrongful conduct, and so no 
wrong is done by killing him. 177  In the context of provocation, the argument is 
that adequate provocation is a wrong (and often a legal wrong) that amounts to a 
forfeiture of the provoking agent’s right not to be killed.  The forfeiture theory, as 
a basis for partial justification, has a symmetrical conceptual problem to that 
encountered by the rights theory: it “should serve to make the defense 
complete,”178 not partial.  Either the victim forfeited his right not to be killed, or he 
did not.179  It makes no sense to say that the provoking agent forfeited part of his 
right. 
 
Once again, we need not argue this point with Dressler.  Our theory of 
partial justification does not entail a claim that the defendant forfeits any part of 
his right.  A person who kills in response to adequate provocation, even in the heat 
of passion, violates his victim’s rights; his action is not all-things-considered 
justified.  Our position is that the circumstances in which the violation of a right 
                                                 
173 Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, supra note 6, at 477. 
174 Id. 
175 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 449 & n.229 (referring to R. Perkins, 
CRIMINAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1969)). 
176 Remember that the degree of mitigation to which the provoked killer is entitled, absent a partial 
excuse also applying, does not suffice to warrant a manslaughter conviction, but rather ought to be 
considered in sentencing. 
177 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 454. 
178 Id. at 456. 
179 Id. at 455. 
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occurs can affect the moral gravity of that violation.  One of the circumstances that 
affect the gravity of a right violation is the degree of intent.  A premeditated killing 
is a greater wrong than a negligent killing, even though they involve violation of 
the same right—the right not to be killed—and violation to the same degree, qua 
right.  (The negligently killed victim is just as dead as the intentionally killed 
victim.)  Another of the factors that affect the gravity of a right violation is a 
worthy motive, such as retaliation for the murder or sexual assault of a loved one.  
The provoking agent has not forfeited any rights, but the killer’s violation of those 
rights is less grave than it would otherwise have been in the absence of the reasons 
provided by the provoker’s conduct. 
 
According to the “lesser harm” theory, killing a person who has done the 
killer a serious moral wrong involves less “social harm” than killing an innocent 
person.180 As the killing causes less harm, it is less wrong.  For Dressler, this is 
the “basic” theory of justification: “The basic theory of justification is that if an 
act is justified there has been no social harm, or, at least, less social harm than if 
the actor did not act as he did.”181 
 
Unlike in response to the rights and forfeiture theories, Dressler does not 
assert that a partial defense on this theory would involve a contradiction.  Rather, 
he acknowledges that the theory is conceptually coherent,182 and even suggests that 
the theory has considerable intuitive force in explaining provocation.183 Dressler 
rejects the lesser harm theory on the basis that it is morally unacceptable. A 
person’s bad conduct should not make his life less valuable than that of an 
innocent person: “Are we to say that immoral conduct, albeit non-life endangering, 
should make a person’s life less deserving of society’s protection?  Such a position 
runs counter to most common law theories of criminal culpability.”184 
 
The moral dangers associated with suggesting the victim deserved to be 
killed have struck a chord with writers concerned that the provocation doctrine 
reinforces beliefs that members of some groups are less worthy than the 
mainstream. Hence Rozelle suggests that calling provocation a partial justification 
“smacks of ‘blame the victim’.”185  Similarly Mison worries that framing 
provocation as a partial justification in cases of homosexual advance expresses the 
notion that the life of a homosexual man is worth less than that of a heterosexual 
man.186   
 
Once again, the appropriate response to this argument is to point out that 
the lesser harm theory is merely one conception of partial justification.  A theory 
of partial justification does not necessarily entail the view that the victim’s life is 
less valued, or is a lesser social harm.  It may be that, ceteris paribus, if conduct 
causes less harm, then the conduct is less wrongful.  But it does not follow that if 
                                                 
180 Id. at 454. Dressler also refers to this theory as the “comparative moral wrongdoing” theory.  
Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, supra note 6, at 477. 
181 Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 450. 
182 Id. at 457. 
183 Id. at 456. 
184 Id. at 458. 
185 Rozelle, Controlling Passion, supra note 9, at 215. 
186 Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter, supra note 4, at 170-74. 
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conduct is less wrongful, then it must have caused less harm.  Accidental killing is 
less wrongful than intentional killing, but the harm is the same.187  The victim of 
an accidental killing neither less valuable, nor more deserving of death, than the 
victim of an intentional homicide. 
 
The harm that an actor intends or anticipates is certainly an important 
factor in determining the degree of wrongfulness of that conduct.  But it is not the 
only factor.  One of the other contributing factors is the set of reasons upon which 
conduct is based.  Once again, the arguments Dressler marshals against this 
particular theory of partial justification do not apply to our conception of partial 
justification. 
 
In summary, first, none of the arguments so far advanced demonstrate that 
the concept of partial justification is incoherent.  Second, none of the arguments 
that particular conceptions of partial justification are either incoherent or morally 
unacceptable apply to the theory of partial justification on which we rely, that of 
partially warranting reasons.  Third, no one appears to have even attempted to 
critique this theory as it applies to partial justification.  Therefore, no sufficient 
argument has been advanced to support the view that partial justification cannot 
form part of the rationale of the provocation defense. 
 
C. Provocation Renders an Intentional Killing Less Wrongful 
 
As we observed above, wrongfulness is a scalar, not merely a binary, 
property.  We take this to be common ground.  Nobody, say, who believes that 
shoplifting or hurling a gratuitous insult is wrongful believes that either is as 
wrongful as rape or murder.  Nobody believes that pick-pocketing is as wrongful 
as genocide.  Importantly, nothing that we have said or contemplated in Section 
III.B. is to the contrary.  Rejection of the concept of partial justification, as we 
explained above, rests on the idea that conduct is either wrongful or not and that 
justified conduct is not wrongful.188  But this idea does not entail that wrongfulness 
does not admit of degrees.  It does not insist that each wrongful act is precisely as 
wrongful as every other wrongful act.  So we will accept as a given that, within the 
universe of wrongful conduct, particular acts can be more or less wrongful than 
others. 
 
Against this background premise, to fully establish that provoked 
intentional killings can be less wrongful, in virtue of the provocation, than 
unprovoked intentional killings, we need to do two things.  First, we need to 
provide and defend a general theoretical account of the determinants of the degree 
of wrongfulness of wrongful conduct.  Second, we need to provide a specific 
                                                 
187 Dressler might respond that the “social harms” in each case are different, as the intent of the 
wrongdoer is somehow a component of the harm caused to society.  But on this copious conception 
of “social harm,” the amount of social harm is not a measure of the worth of the victim.  Treating a 
provoked killing as less harmful is not to treat the victim as less valuable, any more than treating an 
accidental killing as less harmful is to treat the victim of an accident as less valuable than the victim 
of a homicide. 
188 This is the dominant view.  Some theorists believe, in contrast, that a justification qualifies 
wrongdoing but does not eliminate it, thus creating three categories rather than two: wrongful and 
unjustified, wrongful but justified, and not wrongful.  See Berman, Justification and Excuse, supra 
note 2, at 7 n.11. 
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account of how killing in response to provocation satisfies the criteria made 
relevant by our general account.  That is a very tall order indeed, for this first step 
would require that we detail and defend something close to a full moral theory, or 
a full account of practical reasoning.  (Consider to begin with that consequentialist 
and nonconsequentialist moral theories are committed to different positions 
regarding the considerations (1) in virtue of which conduct is wrongful and (2) that 
determine the magnitude of a wrong.  Likewise, different theories within each of 
these two broad ethical families are apt to supply different answers.)  Accordingly, 
we cannot tackle in this paper the daunting task of establishing that the lesser 
wrongfulness thesis is true across diverse moral theories. 
 
Instead, our plan of attack in this section is to sketch the rudiments of a 
general account of wrongfulness and to offer reasons, consistent with that general 
account, to believe that an intentional killing is less wrongful when in response to 
adequate provocation.  (We will not try to demarcate the contours of the class of 
adequate provocations, contenting ourselves in this section to argue that it is a non-
null set.)  We will then consider objections to this account—objections that must 
themselves be consistent with the thesis that wrongfulness has variable magnitude 
or weight—and explain why we find them unpersuasive.  If this leaves us some 
distance short of having proven that intentional homicide is less wrongful when 
responsive to (adequate) provocation, it should nonetheless establish why one 
might reasonably think so, and thus might well explain the provocation doctrine 
even if it does not (as we believe it does) defend it. 
 
1. Affirmative Account.—Let us start with some remarks about wrongful 
conduct or wrongdoing (terms that we will treat as synonymous) that, while not 
uncontroversial in all particulars, are well within orthodox thinking.  Morality is 
concerned with guiding behavior and providing the basis for a certain type of 
criticism.  Moral reasons are the subset of all reasons that concern the regard we 
ought to pay the interests of others, what T.M. Scanlon calls “what we owe to each 
other.”189  One ought to act in accordance with the balance of nonexcluded 
reasons.  (In the Razian account of practical reason, the broad outlines of which we 
follow here, exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons not to act on certain 
first-order reasons.  So, for example, the fact that A has promised to attend B’s 
party on Saturday night excludes or preempts, and does not merely outweigh, some 
of what would otherwise be perfectly acceptable reasons for A to pursue activities 
on Saturday night that are incompatible with his attendance at B’s party.)190  One 
acts wrongfully if he acts against the direction of applicable moral reasons that are 
                                                 
189 T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
190 One of us has suggested elsewhere that this model should be revised to distinguish between 
wrongdoing and ought-to-be-doneness on something like the following lines.  See Berman, 
Blackmail, supra note 118.  What morally ought to be done is what the balance of nonexcluded 
moral reasons directs.  And what morality commands of us is that we try to determine what the 
balance of nonexcluded moral reasons directs, and then that we act in conformity with the 
conclusion we reach at this first, deliberative, stage.  Thus, if we reach a sincere but erroneous 
judgment that what ought to be done in a given case is φ, and then do φ, we do not act wrongfully 
even though we fail to act in accordance with what the balance of nonexcluded moral reasons 
direct.  For simplicity of analysis, we ignore this refinement in our discussion in the text.  We 
believe, however, that the simpler analysis we provide could be revised to accommodate 
complications or nuances of the foregoing sort.  
45 
not themselves outweighed or excluded by other applicable reasons, moral or 
otherwise.   
 
The nature, character, and constituents of wrongdoing are, of course, 
central concerns of moral philosophy.  Moral philosophers have paid less attention, 
however, to questions regarding the magnitudes of wrongdoings.  (Perhaps this 
should not surprise: if moral reasoning directs that  would be wrong, then it ought 
not be done, and the separate questions of how wrong it is, and therefore how much 
it ought not be done might strike some as rather beside the point.)  But insofar as 
wrongdoing itself is in some sense the upshot or consequence of a balancing of 
reasons, it seems plausible to suppose that the magnitude of wrongful action is a 
function of the extent to which the nonexcluded moral reasons against it outweigh 
or outdistance the nonexcluded reasons in its favor.  Take again the case of 
promising.  Suppose that A stays home Saturday night because his child is ill.  
Caring for an ill child, we suppose, is a reason not to attend the party that the 
promise does not exclude.  But that does not necessarily mean that staying home is 
morally permissible all things considered or even that it is morally permissible 
against the moral reasons created by the fact of his promise.  If, say, the child’s 
illness is minor and another responsible adult is available to care for her, then the 
reason for A to keep his promise might render his decision to stay home wrongful.  
Nonetheless, because he does have a good reason to stay home, his staying home is 
less wrongful than it would have been had he stayed home to watch a television 
program he enjoys or merely because he felt unsociable. 
 
If that sketch of the nature and magnitude of wrongdoing is fundamentally 
correct, then it remains only to determine whether there exist types of wrongdoing 
in which an actor might engage that would give another person reason(s) to kill 
her, which reason(s) are insufficient to prevent the killing from being wrongful but 
sufficient to reduce its wrongfulness by an amount that would warrant recognition 
from the legal system.  We believe that an affirmative answer is exemplified by 
Villain’s intentional killing of Parent’s child.  In a case such as this, we think that, 
ordinarily, Parent has such reason to kill Villain.   
 
That this is so might emerge more clearly if we first assume something 
approximating the state of nature, or at least a state with a notably ineffectual 
criminal justice apparatus.  Here, most of the reasons customarily invoked to 
justify state punishment—and capital punishment in particular—seem to provide 
reasons for Parent to kill Villain: e.g., to give Villain what he deserves (for those 
who believe that one deserves to suffer, or to be punished, on account of his 
blameworthy wrongdoing); to prevent Villain from victimizing other innocent 
persons; to deter similar acts of aggression by others; and to express the 
appropriate degree of moral outrage toward Villain’s actions, an outrage that, 
punishment skeptics notwithstanding, might be hard to express in other than pallid 
form through other means.  Furthermore, Parent has special agent-relative reason 
to be the author of Villain’s punishment, either to satisfy an obligation of loyalty 
owed Villain’s victim (Parent’s child) or to avenge the wrong done Parent himself, 
albeit derivatively.  To be sure, we do not expect all readers or all citizens to agree 
that each of these considerations underwrites a reason for Parent to kill Villain.  
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But we do expect most readers to recognize at least some of these as valid reasons 
of nontrivial, perhaps substantial, weight.191 
 
 No doubt things are different when we introduce a working state with a 
reasonably effective, if imperfect, system of criminal justice.  In general, the 
existence of the state likely strengthens some of the preexisting reasons, and adds 
new ones, for Parent not to kill Villain.  For example, there is a greatly increased 
likelihood that retributivist, deterrent and incapacitative objectives will be served 
even if Parent stays his hand.  Additionally, the social costs of private vengeance 
are greater if public order is already reasonably well maintained.  So whether or 
not it would have been wrongful for Parent to kill Villain in the absence of an 
effective centralized enforcement system, it seems rather clearly wrongful under 
contemporary developed conditions. 
 
But we would caution against exaggerating the extent to which the 
existence of a moderately effective state changes the moral terrain as it bears on 
the present question. The state’s existence provides some new moral reasons for 
Parent not to kill Villain and adds weight to preexisting reasons not to kill.192  It 
might also displace or eliminate some reasons that would lend support to Parent 
killing Villain.  However we think it implausible that the presence of the state 
extinguishes all the reasons that Parent would have had, absent the state, to kill 
Villain.  For one thing, law enforcement is far from perfect. Parent might 
reasonably believe, and it might well be the case, that if he does not himself act, 
Villain has a good chance of escaping capture, conviction, or punishment.  If so, 
Parent’s retributive and incapacitative reasons to kill that we previously invoked 
would be preserved, if to attenuated degrees.  Furthermore, any agent-relative 
reasons Parent might have to act against Villain are likely to be similarly preserved 
despite the existence of the state.  Consider Stranger, who, like Parent, reasonably 
believes Villain is unlikely to be caught or punished.  Both Parent and Stranger 
have (attenuated) reasons of incapacitation and retribution that lend support to 
either of them killing Villain.  But Parent has reasons for killing Villain that 
Stranger does not share: to fulfill a duty of loyalty to Parent's child, or to avenge a 
wrong done Parent himself, and so on.  If Parent reasonably (and perhaps rightly) 
believes that Villain would escape punishment by the state, not only are there 
reasons for Parent to want Villain killed, but there are also reasons for Parent, and 
not Stranger, to do the killing.  In sum, then, while the existence of an effective 
state surely affects the moral calculus, it is far from wholly transformative.  If 
Parent would have reasons to kill Villain sufficient to render his killing less 
wrongful in the absence of an effective state, such reasons likely exist (in 
weakened form) even in the world as we know it. 
 
                                                 
191 The case in favor of Parent’s lesser wrongdoing is likely to be strengthened if, as suggested 
earlier, the moral command is not “to act in accordance with the balance of (nonexcluded) reasons,” 
but (to a first approximation) “to reason sincerely and sensitively about what the balance of reasons 
demands, and then to act in accordance with the conclusion that one has reached.”  See Berman, 
Blackmail, supra note 118. 
192 Of course, it also adds legal reasons not to kill.  But to avoid circularity (we are, after all, trying 
to make sense of the way that a legal rule might be responsive to the moral status of one’s actions), 
we must here be concerned with the moral reasons that bear on Parent’s situation and not the legal 
reasons except insofar as the latter help shape the former. 
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2.  Challenges.— The first possible challenge to this argument would reject 
our general account of the determinants of the magnitude of wrongdoing.  On the 
competing view we have in mind, the degree to which a wrongful action is 
wrongful is a function entirely of the wrongmaking reasons and not at all a 
function of the delta—that is, the difference—between the wrongmaking reasons 
and the putatively justifying ones.  For example, homicide is more wrongful than 
vandalism just because the reasons against killing a person are stronger than the 
reasons against destroying somebody’s property.  Reasons that tend in favor of an 
action need not be considered at all if they are insufficient to render it permissible. 
 
This alternative view is highly implausible.  It seems plainly wrong if we 
assume a consequentialist moral framework in which the right is a function of the 
good and the good is determined entirely by aggregating states of affairs.  But this 
alternative view seems arbitrary and unmotivated even on nonconsequentialist 
assumptions.  Consider Slow Swimmer and Fast Swimmer, shipwrecked and 
swimming for a plank that can accommodate only one.  If Fast Swimmer reaches 
the plank first (or looks poised to reach it first) and Slow Swimmer shoves him 
aside, Slow Swimmer acts wrongfully on most moral views.  (In Anglo-American 
law, she would not be entitled to the justificatory defenses of self-defense, 
necessity, or duress of circumstances.)  But now consider Boater, floating by in a 
skiff, who pushes Fast Swimmer off the plank because he wants the wood to make 
picture frames and planters that he will sell at flea markets.  We contend that 
Boater is not merely more blameworthy than Slow Swimmer, but also that his 
action is more wrongful.  In these paired cases, however, the reasons against the 
action are constant—namely, whatever reasons weigh against knowingly causing 
the death of another human being.  What distinguish the cases are the reasons for 
which Slow Swimmer and Boater act.  If Slow Swimmer’s act is less wrongful, 
that lends substantial support for our claim that reasons that fall short of rendering 
putatively wrongful action justified can nonetheless render it less wrongful. 
 
The remaining challenges accept, at least arguendo, our general account of 
degrees of wrongfulness—namely, that (perhaps loosely speaking) magnitude of 
wrongdoing is a function of the delta between wrongmaking and supportive 
reasons for action—but deny that any sort of provocation is adequate to supply an 
actor with reason(s) to intentionally cause the death of another of a character and 
force sufficient to (nontrivially) reduce the wrongfulness of the killing.  First, one 
could object that none of the putative reasons we invoked above, or any others, are 
in fact good reasons to intentionally cause another’s death.  Second, one could 
contend that, insofar as they are good reasons, or would be under certain 
assumptions, they are reasons that the provoker’s right to life excludes from 
consideration. 
 
We have little to say in response to the first of these two objections.  While 
we have already tried to present in a sympathetic light the reasons in favor of 
Parent’s killing of Villain (reasons, it bears reiteration one last time, that are 
defeated by the reasons against), we have also acknowledged that these claimed 
reasons may not have merit under all moral theories and theories of value.  And we 
have further acknowledged that we don’t present arguments sufficient to establish 
the case decisively if what we have said thus far does not resonate.  We will add 
only this.  Imagine you learn that A, an acquaintance, has killed B.  In response to 
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your query or criticism, A says: “I had a reason.  B killed my child.”  “Still,” you 
might say, “you ought not to have done it.”  Or:  “What you did was wrong.”  The 
instant question is whether you would go so far as to assert:  “But that’s no reason 
at all!” We expect that would be your response were A to have said: “I had a 
reason.  I hate black people” (or white people, or gay people, or tall people, or 
people who listen to opera).  That fact, you would say, might explain the killing 
but is no reason for it.  If you would find such a response appropriate in some 
cases but not in the case of Parent and Villain, we suspect that is because you 
recognize that the fact that Villain killed Parent’s child, while not itself precisely a 
reason for Parent to kill Villain, does support such reasons and is therefore 
telegraphic of them. 
 
The second objection is slightly different.  It allows that Parent has reasons 
to kill Villain, perhaps reasons captured by the retributivist, deterrent, 
incapacitative, and agent-relative considerations to which we have already alluded, 
but claims that such reasons count among those that Villain’s right to life 
specifically excludes.  The “right to life,” the argument might go, captures what 
Raz calls a “protected reason”—a first-order reason not to cause death backed or 
reinforced by a second-order reason not to act on various first-order reasons that 
might come into conflict with the possessor’s interests in life.  The reasons that 
would otherwise support Parent’s actions are excluded by the second-order reason.  
But reasons grounded in promoting or protecting the lives of others are not 
excluded.  This is why Slow Swimmer’s killing of Fast Swimmer is less wrongful 
than would be Boater’s killing of Fast Swimmer: the reasons supporting Slow 
Swimmer’s action are precisely among those that Fast Swimmer’s right to life does 
not exclude. 
 
Possibly.  Indeed, an argument that does not deny tout court that the 
reasons Parent would invoke in support of his killing of Villain are good reasons, 
but seeks instead to show why they are excluded from our practical reasoning by 
the reasons that render killing wrongful in the first place, strikes us as the most 
promising potential line of attack against our thesis.  At present, though, we are not 
persuaded.  First, some of Parent’s reasons for killing Villain—those that sound in 
deterring evildoers like him and in preventing Villain himself from harming other 
innocents—would seem, on this competing account, not to be excluded from the 
set of reasons that determine right conduct.  Furthermore, vastly more argument is 
needed to establish just what sorts of reasons are excluded by the protected reason 
that corresponds to an individual’s supposed right to life.  Equally or more 
plausibly, it seems to us, is that the excluded reasons are limited to more quotidian 
reasons for action like promoting the actor’s own pleasure and convenience, and 
promoting ordinary welfare.  That agent-relative reasons to avenge a grievous 
wrong—reasons that might themselves plausibly be conceived as obligations of a 
sort—are also excluded requires sustained argument, we think, and cannot be 
merely asserted. 
 
Those who argue that provoked killing is not less wrongful than a 
paradigmatic murder bear the argumentative burden for another reason as well.  
The case of Parent killing Villain establishes the intuitive (or perhaps prima facie) 
appeal of the claim that an intentional killing provoked by a grievous wrong can be 
less wrong than a typical murder.  Those who reject our account of lesser wrongs 
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must either contend that Parent’s conduct is just as wrong as that of the typical 
murder, or provide an alternative explanation for why it is less wrong. 
 
 A final challenge, like the previous two, accepts our general account of 
degrees of wrongdoing, but questions whether the requirement that the accused act 
in a heat of passion precludes our reliance on this account of wrongdoing.  If the 
killer was too embroiled in anger to conform his behavior to the balance of 
reasons, the objection would run, then he might seem unable to draw moral credit, 
as it were, from the fact that reasons in fact existed to support (but not to fully 
justify) his action.  Put another way, the wrongfulness vel non of an action is not a 
function solely of the guiding or true reasons that obtain, but on whether they are 
explanatory reasons too—i.e., reasons that in fact explain why he acted.  If this is 
so, then the particular marriage of partial excuse and partial justification that we 
seek to effectuate would be unworkable because the demands that the defendant 
have some good reason to do as he did and that he was too engulfed by passion to 
adhere to reason stand in a contradictory relationship.    
 
This challenge evokes a debate in criminal law theory between proponents 
of “subjective” and “objective” theories of justification, especially in the context of 
what are often called “unknowing justifications.”  Roughly, subjectivists about 
justification believe that whether an actor is justified depends only upon whether 
he nonculpably believed that facts existed which would support his violating a 
criminal prohibition, as by using force against another; objectivists believe that the 
validity of a justification depends only upon whether the facts did in fact exist. The 
issue arises more commonly when an accused mistakenly believed that his life was 
endangered (or that some other sort of important interest was threatened).  The 
“unknowing justification” variant arises when the converse is true: the actor is 
unaware of facts that would unproblematically support a justification were the 
actor to have been aware of them and to have acted (in some sense) because of 
them.  An example is the accused who attacks a seemingly innocent and 
unthreatening person who, unbeknownst to the accused, was just about to attack 
the accused or some innocent third party. 
 
We say that this challenge evokes the subjective/objective debate over 
justifications because the challenge would seem wholly to lack force against those 
who adhere to the fully “objective” theory of justification in which justification 
(full or partial) depends only upon the existence of guiding reasons.  Be that as it 
may, we are not objectivists about justification.  We agree that reasons that are 
grounded on facts of which the actor is unaware do not help to justify his action 
against the wrong-making reasons of which he is aware.193  It may seem, then, that 
this final challenge should worry us. 
 
It does not.  In cases of provocation, the killer is only too aware of the most 
fundamental fact that gives birth to reasons to kill—namely, the wrong that his 
victim has done him (or one close to him).  Given his emotional state, the killer is 
not likely to have immediate access to all the reasons themselves—reasons that we 
have described by reference to the values of retribution, deterrence, loyalty, etc.  
                                                 
193 For arguments by one of us in support of that position, see Mitchell N. Berman, Lesser Evils and 
Justification: A Less Close Look, 24 LAW & PHIL. 681 (2005). 
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But unlike the paradigmatic putatively unknowingly justified actor, the provoked 
killer is aware of the underlying facts.  It’s just that, by hypothesis, he is not 
consciously adverting to the good reasons that correspond to, or are grounded 
upon, those facts.  We do not believe that the subjectivist component to the correct 
account of magnitude of wrongdoing properly requires that the actor consciously 
advert to the reasons that bear on the gravity of his wrongdoing in just the way that 
this objection contemplates. Rather, the reasons that serve to partially justify his 
action are available to him, for purposes of assessing the magnitude of his 
wrongdoing, so long as he is aware of the facts that underwrite those reasons, and 
his awareness of those facts has the right sort of causal relationship to his action. 
 
 D.  Final Observations 
 
In this final section we develop two features of our analysis that the 
particularly attentive reader might have inferred from the analysis to this point, but 
warrant more explicit emphasis, lest they be missed. 
 
1. The touchstone of adequate provocation.—Existing provocation doctrine 
is mildly ambiguous regarding what the touchstone of adequate provocation is.  
Most statutory provisions and commentators require that the provocation be such 
as to cause a reasonable person to experience heat of passion.194  Others require 
that the provocation must be adequate to provoke a reasonable man to action.195    
 
Our account decouples the provocation and heat-of-passion requirements.  
It would require that the defendant be in a heat of passion and that the provocation 
be of the sort that gives the defendant reasons to kill (subject to a substantial 
qualification discussed below).  This is the more demanding test for provocation, 
for while it is hard to imagine the cases in which provocation would satisfy that 
standard yet not satisfy the orthodox one, the converse is not true.  It seems that 
many provocations might be adequate to cause an ordinary person to be enraged to 
a degree in which the power of self-control is greatly impeded, yet which are 
inadequate to furnish a genuine reason to kill the provoker. 
 
                                                 
194 See, e.g., Georgia, GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-2 (provocation must be sufficient to incite 
“irresistible passion” in a reasonable person); Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (provocation must be 
“sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person”); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:31 (provocation must be “sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool 
reflection”). LaFave declares, “It is sometimes stated that, in order to reduce an intentional killing 
to voluntary manslaughter, the provocation involved much be such as to cause a reasonable man to 
kill.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 777.  He further says that, “Language to this effect 
is to be found in many of the modern statutes.” Id. at 777 n. 14. We have found no language in the 
statutes that refers to causing the reasonable man to kill.  The closest are the statutes referred to 
above which require that a reasonable man would have lost self-control or that the provocation 
would have been “irresistible.” 
195 Ashworth declares that the test of adequate provocation is “whether the provocation was 
‘enough to make a reasonable person do as [the accused] did.”  Ashworth, The Doctrine of 
Provocation, supra note 3 at 298.   Ashworth does not provide a cite for the claim in quotation 
marks, but is presumably referring to s. 3 of the English Homicide Act, which provides: “Where on 
a charge of murder there is evidence on which a jury can find that the person charged was provoked 
… to lose self-control, the question whether the provocation  was enough to make a reasonable 
person do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury.”  The Homicide Act, §. 3, supra note 
33 (emphasis added). 
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On our account, then, manslaughter should probably be available in a 
smaller class of cases than would be the case in jurisdictions that measure the 
adequacy of provocation by its tendency to cause anger in a reasonable person.  
But this would be so only when the nominal and actual sentencing range for 
murder is broad and in which the sentencing authority (judge or jury) is willing to 
grant the mitigation for murder that might often be due when loss of control is 
present but a genuine reason to kill is absent.  If intentional killers who do not 
qualify for manslaughter cannot realistically get the mitigation that is due them, 
then a more expansive manslaughter regime is justifiable as a second-best solution.  
This follows from a point we have already tried to emphasize: the fact that an 
intentional killer should not be entitled to the partial defense of manslaughter does 
not, on our account, entail that he does not have a sound claim to be punished 
less—even significantly less—than the paradigmatic or statistically ordinary 
murderer. 
 
2. Whether the accused must have reason “to kill.”—In presenting our 
affirmative account, we exploited the example of a parent who (while in a heat of 
passion) kills the murderer of her child.  We claimed that the parent in fact has 
reasons to kill.  We contrasted this case with cases like Carr and Raguseo, in 
which the killer plainly lacked any such reason.  Admittedly, these examples 
represent something close to the polar cases.  More needs to be said about the 
intermediate case in which the provoked killer has ample reason to do something 
to his victim—let’s say, not putting a very fine point on it, that he has reason “to 
retaliate”—but may not have reason to kill him.  Consider Bully’s unprovoked 
beating of Ordinary Joe, an assault that causes massive bleeding and broken bones, 
but leaves Joe very much alive.  If, after the assault is complete and without fear of 
additional attack, but while still subject to the heat of passion, Joe stabs Bully in 
the back, killing him, would he be entitled to provocation mitigation on our 
analysis? 
 
Perhaps this example is too thinly sketched to permit confident conclusions 
regarding whether Joe had (some, but insufficient) reason to kill Bully, though we 
think he did not and expect that most readers would share that judgment.  
Whatever you might think about this particular case, we mean only to invite you to 
imagine a case in which you would believe that the killer had reason to retaliate or 
“to effect a punitive response,” but not reason to kill.  It might seem to follow that, 
on our account, Joe is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction on our account.  In 
fact, that does not necessarily follow.  To understand why requires that we attend 
more carefully than we have thus far to the act description killing.   
 
Any bodily movement can be described under an innumerable number of 
distinct act descriptions.  One given act might answer to all of the following 
descriptions: moving one’s index finger, firing a handgun, firing a Glock .45, 
shooting at a person, killing, murdering, assassinating the president, etc.  If I cause 
the death of a pedestrian by driving when speeding, my action was wrong not 
because it is wrong to kill a person, but because it is wrong to drive carelessly, or 
recklessly, or too fast.  When I try to justify my conduct by invoking my reason to 
drive fast—say, I was rushing a gunshot victim to the hospital—the question is not 
whether that need justifies killing someone, but whether it justifies driving fast (as 
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fast as I had been driving).  The appropriate act description (putting negligence 
aside) must be sensitive to what I took myself to be doing.   
 
In the case of Parent and Villain, we have assumed that Parent acted with 
intent to kill and we have argued that Parent had reason to do just that.  In contrast, 
we are assuming that Joe lacked reason to try to kill Bully.  But—and here’s why 
manslaughter might nonetheless still be available to him—Joe might not have had 
any such intent.  Surely in some homicide cases in which a defendant hopes for a 
manslaughter conviction, his only intent was “to punish” the victim or “to teach 
him a lesson” or “to hurt” him.  The balance of reasons model we have employed 
would seem to open up a sizeable space in which an actor has reason to act under a 
description like this even when he would not have reason to act under the 
description to kill.  In some set of these cases, the accused would have reason to 
act under the description to grievously harm while lacking reason to act under the 
description to kill.  Of course, under the common law and most current codes, the 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm counts as “malice” and supports a murder 
conviction when death results.  There is some uncertainty regarding whether 
provocation manslaughter is available when the (provable) intent is to cause 
grievous bodily harm, but not to kill.196  A negative answer to that question, we 
submit, is crazy.  While it is a fallacy that the greater always or necessarily 
includes the lesser, it usually does—or should.  When the defendant did not intend 
to kill but only intended to cause grievous bodily harm, and when the defendant 
had reason to do the latter, but not to do the former, he should, on our analysis, be 
entitled to the partial defense of provocation197—assuming, of course, that the heat 
of passion prong is satisfied too. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The search for an explanation for the provocation defense has become 
something of a cause célèbre among American criminal theorists over the last 
quarter century.  The primary focus of this search has been the question of how 
provocation fits into the justification-excuse framework of criminal defenses.  The 
orthodox view is that provocation is a partial excuse.  While some adherents of 
partial excuse allow that the provoked killer’s anger may be justified, they deny 
that the killing itself is even partially justified.  One small camp of dissenting 
                                                 
196 Some modern statutes include language that appears to define provocation as requiring an intent 
to kill.  See, e.g., Indiana, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3 (provocation applies to a person who “knowingly 
or intentionally kills”); Kansas, KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3403 (provocation applies to an 
“intentional killing of a human being”); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (provocation applies to a 
person who “intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion”).  Courts have 
also often defined provocation “as if intent to kill were a required ingredient.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 33, at 776 and 776 n.3.  Despite the presence of this restrictive language, the great 
majority of jurisdictions allow a provocation defense in cases of intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm, but not to kill. Id. 
197 Say that intentionally injuring (X) is a lesser included offense of intentionally killing (Y).  Now 
consider three possibilities regarding when Y is partially justified: (1) if there are some (but 
insufficient) reasons to Y; (2) if there are full and sufficient reasons to X, even if no reasons to Y; 
and (3) if there are some (but insufficient) reasons to X, and no reasons to Y.  We have defended 
proposition (1).  While we do not advocate proposition (2), our defense of (1) does not necessarily 
exclude (2)—an approach with affinities to those advanced by Greenawalt and Rozelle. 
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scholars argues that provocation is a partial justification.  Another camp claims 
that provocation is best understood as neither a justification nor an excuse. 
 
None of these rationales provides a convincing explanation for the central 
features of the provocation doctrine.  Partial excuse theories can explain the heat of 
passion requirement, but struggle to explain the adequate provocation requirement.  
Partial justification theories have the opposite problem.  We propose that 
provocation is best explained as a combination of the two: the defense is limited to 
intentional killings that are both partially excused and partially justified (or less 
wrong, which comes to the same thing).  This theory provides a natural 
explanation for both the adequate provocation and heat of passion requirements.  It 
also explains why the provocation defense results in a lesser defense—
manslaughter—rather than merely a lower sentence.   
  
We analyze partially justified actions as those supported by some 
unexcluded reasons, but not supported by the balance of unexcluded reasons 
bearing on that action.  Scholars have traditionally resisted a combined partial-
excuse/partial-justification rationale for provocation due to the long shadow cast 
by two claims: the mutual exclusivity thesis and the claim that partial justification 
is incoherent.  We demonstrate that the mutual exclusivity thesis is wrong, at least 
as it pertains to partial excuse and partial justification.  We suggest that skepticism 
of partial justification is overstated, but point out that, in any event, such 
skepticism is negated by replacing “partial justification” with “less wrong.”   
 
In sum, heat of passion and adequate provocation are necessary conditions 
of provocation because the defense is limited to intentional killings that are less 
wrong in virtue of the defendant’s reason for killing, and for which the defendant 
is partially excused in virtue of his being in the thrall of strong emotions that 
substantially impeded his ability to conform his conduct to what the balance of 
reasons required. 
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APPENDIX: SENTENCING RANGES FOR PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER AND 
MURDER 
 
 Provocation Manslaughter Murder 
Alabama 2-20 10-99 
Alaska < 20 20-99 (1st deg),  10-99 (2nd deg) 
Arizona 3-12 25 - Life (1st deg), 10-22 /16 (2nd) 
Arkansas 3-20 (5 – 20 aggravated) 10-life 
California 3, 6, or 11 years 25-life 
Colorado 3 – 6 (5 – 12 aggravated) Life 
Connecticut 1-20, 5-20 (aggravated) 5-40 (with 
firearm) 
25-life 
Delaware 2-25 Life (1st deg), 10-life (2nd deg) 
Florida <15 Life 
Georgia <20 Life 
Hawaii <20 Life w/o parole (1st), life w/ parole 
(2nd) 
Idaho <15 10-life 
Illinois 4-20 (called 2nd degree murder) 20-life 
Indiana 6-20 (20-50 with deadly weapon) 45-55, advisory 55, life possible  
Iowa 10 Life (1st), 25-50 (2nd) 
Kansas 7.5-8.5 (truth in sentencing guidelines) Life (1st), 9-15 (2nd) 
Kentucky 10-20 Life 
Louisiana <40 Life w/o parole 
Maine <5 (<10 with firearm) 25-life 
Maryland <20 Life (1st deg), 30 (2nd deg) 
Massachusetts <2.5 (<= life with infernal weapon) Life 
Michigan <15 Life 
Minnesota 10 Life (1st deg), <40 (2nd), <25 (3rd) 
Mississippi 2-20 Life 
Missouri 5-15 10-life 
Montana 2-40 10-100 
Nebraska 1-20 Life w/o parole (1st), life w/ parole 
(2nd) 
Nevada 1-10 20-life (1st deg), 10-life (2nd deg) 
New Hampshire <30 Life 
New Jersey 5-10 30-life 
New Mexico 6 15-life 
New York 5-25 25-life (1st deg), 15-life (2nd deg) 
North Carolina 3-9 (truth in sentencing) 10-life 
North Dakota <20 (lower grade of murder) 30-life 
Ohio 3-10 15-life 
Oklahoma >4 Life w/o parole (1st), 10-life (2nd) 
Oregon <20 25-life 
Pennsylvania* <20 Life (1st & 2nd), <40 (3rd) 
Rhode Island <30 Life (1st deg), 10-life (2nd) 
South Carolina 2-30 30-life 
South Dakota <= life Not less than life 
Tennessee 3-15 Life (1st), 15-life (2nd) 
Texas 2-20 (“murder with mitigated 
punishment”) 
5-99 
Utah 1-15 5-life 
Vermont 1-15 35-life (1st deg), 20-life(2nd) 
Virginia 1-10 20-life 
Washington <= life Life 
West Virginia 1-10 Life (1st), 10-40 (2nd) 
Wisconsin <60 Life (1st), <60 (2nd) 
Wyoming <20 Life (1st), 20-life (2nd) 
